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INTRODUCTION 
Below the steep Santa Ynez mountain range in Santa Barbara 
County lays the unincorporated town of Montecito.  The town is located 
on the alluvial fan created by sediment and sandstone boulders from the 
mountain range above.  The Thomas Fire burned through approximately 
282,000 acres from Santa Paula through Ventura and to the mountains 
above Santa Barbara and Montecito in the fall of 2017.1  Southern 
California Edison admitted that its equipment likely ignited the Thomas 
Fire.2  Unfortunately, the greatest devastation for the small town of 
Montecito occurred on the night of January 9, 2018, when heavy rainfall 
caused catastrophic erosion of the burned slopes and debris swept 
through the sleeping community killing 23 people and demolishing 130 
homes.3 
Who should pay for this disaster?  The impacted individuals, 
families, and businesses sued Edison because its equipment likely 
sparked the fire that burned the slopes, which caused the rain erosion and 
killed the people who lived in the houses built in the floodplain.4  In 
return, Edison sued Santa Barbara County, alleging that county officials 
and planners had allowed increasing development and the building of 
bridges in designated flood zones, which contributed to the debris flow.5  
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 1. News Release, Southern Cal. Edison Int’l, SCE Provides an Update on the Circumstances 
Pertaining to the 2017 Thomas Fire (Oct. 30, 2018), https://newsroom.edison.com/releases/sce-
provides-an-update-on-the-circumstances-pertaining-to-the-2017-thomas-fire [https://perma.cc/5MU 
2-NEZB]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Joe Mozingo, Edison Sues Santa Barbara County Over Last Year’s Deadly Mudslides, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2019, 4:45 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-montecito-
mudslide-lawsuit-20190118-story.html [https://perma.cc/7J3W-RSWD]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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Edison also sued the California Department of Transportation for the 
freeway bridges, the flood control district for the debris-filled basins, the 
City of Santa Barbara for allowing commercial development in a city 
zone adjacent to Montecito, and the Montecito Water District for a 
broken water main that contributed to the flooding.6 
Rain from Hurricane Florence, which struck the Carolinas in 
September 2018, killed more than fifty people7 and caused massive 
flooding, waterlocking cities throughout the region.8  State officials in 
South Carolina ordered National Guard troops and transportation 
workers to erect a barrier in the inland community of Conway to protect 
the gateway route into Myrtle Beach and tourist towns from flooding 
while potentially redirecting waters into local neighborhoods.9  While 
local officials in Conway hired a lawyer to block the barrier by seeking 
injunctive relief, the Myrtle Beach mayor supported building a barrier to 
protect beach businesses that depend on September visitors and 
discounted Conway’s fears of community flooding.10  Conway resident 
Georgia Johnson protested that the officials were “going to block off 
where nature wants to flow,” and said officials should “do things for the 
good of all, not some.”11  Her husband Lex, who trained as a mechanical 
engineer, worried that the barrier would only make the flooding worse.12  
Conway officials pointed to the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey in 
Houston the prior year, when residents filed suit against the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers alleging a taking of their properties after the agency 
released excess water from reservoirs and flooded their neighborhoods.13 
The government may take property for public use by condemning it 
for redevelopment or infrastructure, or restricting a property owner’s 
rights by burdensome regulation.  It may also give property rights by 
granting broadcasting or easement rights to cable companies, eliminating 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Gabriella Borter, Hurricane Florence Death Toll Rises to 51, REUTERS (Oct. 2, 2018, 1:39 
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-florence/hurricane-florence-death-toll-rises-to-51-id 
USKCN1MC2JJ [https://perma.cc/7J9B-V8DU]. 
 8. Florence Gone but Its Flooding a Crisis in Parts of North Carolina — Live Updates, CBS 
NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/live-news/hurricane-florence-aftermath-weather-flooding-power-
outage-death-toll-fema-latest-forecast-live/ [https://perma.cc/2CUH-EGSP] (last updated Sept. 19, 
2018, 1:38 AM). 
 9. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, South Carolina Officials Clash Over Flood Barrier, L.A. TIMES 
(Sept. 16, 2018, 8:05 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-south-carolina-river-barrier-
20180916-story.html [https://perma.cc/3DRR-VG8C]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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development restrictions on wetlands, or building a park in a residential 
area.14  Similarly, the effects of disasters and climate change will be 
uneven, with some areas benefitting from longer growing seasons and 
temperate weather, and other areas fighting drought, violent weather 
episodes, and sea level rises.15  Just as there are winners and losers when 
the government or a private entity takes private property for a public use, 
there are both winners and losers from the effects of disasters and climate 
change. 
Flooding cases in particular illustrate how the benefits from 
government actions (“givings”) may offset or defeat takings claims.16  
Even though a government project for flood control may cause damage 
to a private landowner, if the project is beneficial overall because it 
reduces general flood dangers, the landowner claiming compensation for 
a taking would receive a windfall.17  The government has provided 
benefits to flood claimants over the years by providing “assistance with 
subsidies and other measures to promote agriculture and urban 
development in the floodplain, and to protect vulnerable floodplain land 
by constructing levees, terraces, and other devices to hold water and 
protect against soil erosion.”18 
Alternatively, tort law could address “government actions involving 
some risk of a potentially foreseeable, yet diffuse, impact,” such as 
flooding cases when government projects have provided landowners with 
more benefits than losses, but “the floodwaters exceed the capabilities of 
those projects.”19  In turn, takings claims could address “purposeful 
appropriations for public benefit, undertaken with intent or substantial 
certainty of the consequence.”20  By distinguishing these claims, the 
 
 14. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 550–51 (2001) 
(presenting the concept of “givings” as the counterpoint to “takings” law). 
 15. J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97 MINN. L. REV. 206, 207–
08 (2012). 
 16. Sandra B. Zellmer, Takings, Torts, and Background Principles, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
193, 237 (2017). 
 17. Id. (citing United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 266–67 (1939)) (“In United States 
v. Sponenbarger, the Supreme Court explained, ‘[A] broad flood control program does not involve a 
taking merely because it will result in an increase in the volume or velocity of otherwise inevitably 
destructive floods, where the program measured in its entirety greatly reduces the general flood 
hazards, and actually is beneficial to a particular tract of land.’” (quoting Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. at 
266)); see also Bartz v. United States, 633 F.2d 571, 578 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (finding “the Fifth 
Amendment does not make the government an insurer against all damages from floods” where a 
flood-control project confers benefits that greatly outweigh damages). 
 18. Zellmer, supra note 16, at 239. 
 19. Id. at 239–40 (“[C]laims such as those brought by landowners affected by the 2011 
Missouri/Mississippi flood should be treated as torts . . . .”). 
 20. Id. (“[C]laims such as those brought by Gulf Coast residents inevitably flooded by the 
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threat of tort litigation may not deter officials from acting and may 
instead encourage them “to make more proactive decisions to operate 
their flood control structures to better protect vulnerable areas and human 
and ecological communities and to restrict or at least mitigate the effects 
of unsustainable development.”21  I instead propose that takings claims 
should not require a showing of purpose, intent, or substantial certainty 
of the consequence.  Takings claims should function to spread the risk by 
distributing equitably the benefits and burdens of actions intended for the 
public benefit.  Such an approach would encourage communities and 
local government to mitigate unsustainable development. 
Certain firefighting situations also demonstrate the concept of 
“windfalls for wipeouts,” such as when the government sets a backfire to 
protect adjacent landowners.22  Deciding where to set a backfire depends 
on a number of factors, such as the weather or specific geographic 
features.23  Landowners do not know whether they will be harmed or 
granted a windfall if the backfire is set on their neighbors’ land.24  Thus, 
a private market solution for redistributing windfalls is unlikely, and the 
government may be compelled to compensate landowners when it sets a 
backfire.25  Assigning a cost to the government will likely cause the 
government to adjust its behavior and use other firefighting techniques if, 
and when, the cost of using backfires increases.26 
The disaster cycle includes the strategic processes of “mitigation, 
emergency response, insurance/liability compensation, [and] 
rebuilding.”27  This Article primarily addresses the insurance/liability 
compensation component of the disaster cycle with lesser emphasis on 
mitigation, emergency response, and rebuilding.  If we as a society value 
using political and legal means to fairly distribute the benefits and 
burdens of our community life together, we must consider what 
mechanisms will be appropriate to account for the “takings” and 
“givings” that occur with government regulation, action, and inaction, as 
well as for climate change winners and losers.  Providing public and 
private services that benefit the public as a whole will come at great cost 
 
MRGO [Mississippi River Gulf Outlet] navigational canal should be treated as takings.”). 
 21. Id. at 240. 
 22. Karen M. Bradshaw, Backfired! Distorted Incentives in Wildfire Suppression Techniques, 
31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 168 (2011) [hereinafter Bradshaw, Backfired!]. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 169. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Daniel A. Farber, Introduction: Legal Scholarship, the Disaster Cycle, and the Fukushima 
Accident, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3 (2012). 
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and we need a better understanding of how we will pay for these costs.  
Tort liability, insurance, utility rates, personal responsibility, taxation at 
the federal, state, and local level, and just compensation for eminent 
domain or inverse condemnation are just some of the remedies we have 
used in the past to spread the costs of providing public benefits. 
Part I begins with a brief history of eminent domain and a discussion 
of federal and state takings clauses and the concept of “public use.”  It 
then focuses on issues that arise in delegating this power to private actors 
such as utilities, corporations, and redevelopment agencies.  With the 
delegation of eminent domain power to private entities comes 
responsibility for just compensation, tort damages, and inverse 
condemnation under state damagings clauses for actions that benefit the 
public.  However, the increasing costs of intensifying disasters cannot be 
entirely borne by governments and private actors.  If we bankrupt the 
entities providing public benefits by holding them responsible for the 
damages caused by beneficial activities, we will eventually face rising 
costs for these benefits through taxation, pricing, insurance, or litigation, 
as well as the possibility of driving these entities out of the business of 
providing public benefits. 
Part II explores using inverse condemnation and damagings claims 
under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and state constitutional 
provisions to distribute the costs of providing public benefits in the face 
of disaster.  This discussion will focus primarily on damages caused by 
flooding, wildfires, and storms, which have all increased in intensity with 
climate change.  The success of using inverse condemnation or 
damagings claims to recover from entities operating for the public 
benefit will depend on the jurisdiction’s approach to these claims and the 
individual factual situations.  Once a court determines that a taking has 
occurred, just compensation will be required.  Part II discusses some of 
the issues landowners face when claiming just compensation as the 
remedy. 
Part III addresses tort liability and insurance as additional means to 
compensate landowners for damages from disasters related to the 
provision of public benefits.  Tort liability may or may not be effective in 
compensating private landowners if sovereign immunity shields the 
government entity.  Distinguishing between tort claims and inverse 
condemnation or damagings claims under state law is at times 
problematic.  Insurance policies or federal and state insurance funds may 
be available to allow landowner recovery for disaster damages.  
However, insurers may also assert subrogation claims against public 
entities for reimbursement of costs.  I suggest that insurers should only 
be able to assert subrogation claims against public or private entities 
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when there is tort liability for negligence or nuisance, not for inverse 
condemnation or damagings claims. 
Part IV briefly examines some of the remaining relevant processes of 
the disaster cycle involving mitigation, emergency response, and 
rebuilding.  The Conclusion suggests alternatives for dealing with the 
compensation portion of the disaster cycle and proposes that inverse 
condemnation and damagings claims be employed as a cost-spreading 
mechanism.  Tort concepts and defenses should not be applicable to 
these claims because the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause “was 
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.”28 
I. EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE FEDERAL AND STATE TAKINGS 
CLAUSES 
A. Background 
Scholars have traced the history of the eminent domain power as far 
back as the Bible where “the prophet Samuel informs the people of Israel 
that the king ‘will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your 
oliveyards, even the best of them.’”29  In 1215, the Magna Carta required 
that before crown officials could seize chattels from a “free man,” there 
needed to be a “legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land” and 
crown officials had to immediately pay money for these seized chattels.30  
While the U.S. Constitution does not “explicitly grant[] the power of 
eminent domain to the national government,” the Fifth Amendment 
requires that the government pay just compensation for a taking.31 
Two historical justifications for eminent domain were: 1) the innate 
power of government sovereignty and 2) the right of the government, as 
“[t]he root of all title,” to reclaim property previously granted to the 
individual.32  However, in modern times, the takings power is justified by 
“concerns of distributive justice” and “economic or planning 
 
 28. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 29. Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 524 (2009) (quoting 1 Samuel 8:14 
(King James)). 
 30. Id. at 525 (quoting MAGNA CARTA, chs. 28, 39 (1215), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR 
LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 11, 16, 17 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959)). 
 31. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).  
 32. Id. at 526. 
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efficiency.”33  Thus, the power of eminent domain plays a major role in 
distributing the burdens of disasters and in planning for increasing 
damages.  The concept of just compensation has existed since the 
beginning of the American colonial period34 and has been justified by the 
rationale that “when some contribution must be made to preserve a 
common thing by such as participate in its benefits, each of them 
contributes only his own share, and no one bears a greater burden than 
another.”35  The U.S. Supreme Court in Armstrong v. United States 
reiterated this rationale, stating the “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that 
private property shall not be taken for a public use without just 
compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”36 
B. Federal and State Takings Clauses 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”37  
Most states have a similar takings clause in their constitutions,38 and 
“[f]ederal and state takings clauses are generally interpreted the same 
way.”39  For eminent domain actions, the two primary issues are whether 
the taking is for a public use and whether the government pays just 
compensation. 
The question as to whether the taking is for a public use is most 
recently guided by the Supreme Court’s Kelo v. City of New London 
decision, which affirmed a broad reading of public use for the federal 
Constitution, but encouraged states to define the term more narrowly if 
they so desired.40  In Kelo, the City of New London approved a private 
 
 33. Id. at 528. 
 34. James W. Ely, Jr., “That Due Satisfaction May Be Made:” The Fifth Amendment and the 
Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 11–13 (1992); William B. 
Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 583 (1972). 
 35. Stoebuck, supra note 34, at 584 (quoting SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET 
GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 1285 (Walter Simons ed., C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Clarendon 
Press 1934) (1672)). 
 36. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 38. Michael B. Kent, Jr., Public Pension Reform and the Takings Clause, 4 BELMONT L. REV. 
1, 4 (2017). 
 39. Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1631 
(2015). 
 40. 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (“[N]othing in our opinion precludes any State from placing 
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development plan to revitalize the City and assembled the land needed 
for the project through voluntary purchase and the use of eminent 
domain.41  Nine of the condemnees, including Susette Kelo, challenged 
the City’s action, claiming that the taking would violate the Fifth 
Amendment’s “public use” restriction.42  The Court held that based on its 
precedential cases of Berman v. Parker43 and Hawaii Housing Authority 
v. Midkiff,44 “using eminent domain to promote economic development” 
was “for a ‘public use’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution.”45 
In the years following the Kelo decision, at least “forty-four states 
have either amended their constitutions or enacted legislation . . . to 
address the [‘public use’] concerns expressed by Justice O’Connor’s 
dissent.”46  These actions have varied, but they mostly focus on 
restricting the use of eminent domain actions for economic development 
and requiring a finding of blight.47 
At the state level, challenging public use is a developing area of law 
in terms of whether an entity may use eminent domain for economic 
development or when negotiations for a lease or purchase fail.48  In 
approximately forty states, it is illegal to use eminent domain for 
economic development.49  Several cases have also held that using 
eminent domain to condemn property is not proper when “a government 
entity has been unhappy with lease or purchase negotiations and then 
uses eminent domain to get the deal it wanted.”50  Using eminent domain 
for redevelopment or blight removal continues to be an active and 
demanding area of litigation.51 
 
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”). 
 41. Id. at 472. 
 42. Id. at 475. 
 43. 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (upholding redevelopment plan targeting blighted area in 
Washington, D.C. even though not all properties condemned were blighted). 
 44. 467 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1984) (upholding Hawai’i statute that transferred fee title from 
lessors to lessees to reduce concentration of land ownership). 
 45. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489–90. 
 46. DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & SHELLEY ROSS SAXER, LAND USE CASES AND 
MATERIALS 340 (7th ed. 2017). 
 47. See David L. Callies, Kelo v. City of New London: Of Planning, Federalism, and a Switch 
in Time, 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 327, 344–45 (2006). 
 48.  See Dana Berliner et al., Challenging the Right-To-Take: A Whirlwind Tour of Cases and 
Issues, A.L.I. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., Feb. 5–7, 2015, at 631. 
 49. Id. (discussing cases holding economic development is not a public use). 
 50. Id. (discussing cases rejecting and upholding condemnations used for such purposes). 
 51. See, e.g., Reading Area Water Auth. v. Schuylkill River Greenway Ass’n, 100 A.3d 572, 
573, 582–84 (Pa. 2014) (holding municipal authority asserting condemnation power was not a public 
utility, and thus condemnation of a drainage easement for the benefit of the private developer 
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C. Delegating Eminent Domain Power to Private Actors for the Public 
Good 
Beginning in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, federal and 
state governments delegated the power of eminent domain to private 
actors, including “turnpike, bridge, canal, and railroad companies,” as 
well as to mill owners who could use eminent domain to “dam 
watercourses and flood neighboring land in order to power mills.”52  
Although state law retreated significantly from using eminent domain in 
the early twentieth century, many states continue to allow private takings 
by private actors.53  Using this power in times of disaster requires the 
government and private entities to make decisions about how to 
distribute public benefits and burdens.  Government agencies must 
decide whether to flood downstream property to protect upstream 
property or vice versa when superstorms produce substantial quantities 
of floodwater. 
Firefighting authorities must decide whether and where to set 
backfires to prevent excessive damage from wildfire depending upon 
geography and other conditions.  Private electric utilities, whose power 
lines cause wildfires and resulting mudflows, face the prospect of 
powering down their electrical equipment and cutting power to millions 
during red flag warnings for severe winds.  These actions may prevent 
damage and injury to some, but may inflict harm on others. 
Granting a private taking power is appropriate in situations where 
“the private market [is] parallel to those where the exercise of a 
governmental taking power is warranted.”54  A private taking power is 
indicated if: “(1) the taker is the preferred owner of the property right 
(for reasons of justice or efficiency); and (2) strategic difficulties block 
the efficient or just transfer of property rights in the market place.”55  
Some critics of private takings assert “the government is more likely than 
private actors to make decisions for the benefit of the public and that the 
 
violated the Property Rights Protection Act); cf. Wymberley Sanitary Works v. Batliner, 904 N.E.2d 
326, 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“The mere fact that the sewer line extension will enhance the value of 
the subdivision to the developer does not alter the fact that there is a public benefit as well.”). 
 52. Bell, supra note 29, at 545. 
 53. Id. at 545–46. 
 54. Id. at 558. 
 55. Id. at 558–59 (proposing three keys to determine government delegation to private actors: 
(1) “likelihood of strategic barriers blocking efficient transfers”; (2) “some reliable mechanism for 
determining that the taking effectuates a transfer to a desirable owner” (just compensation is a basic 
requirement); and (3) “the pliability rule created by the private taking power should be superior to 
alternative pliability rules, or government mediation”). 
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public benefit is more likely to be served when taken property is held by 
the government than when held by private actors.”56  However, empirical 
studies show that outsourcing to private providers is more efficient than 
public services.57 
There are conflicts in regards to the authority that private actors and 
government officials possess to use eminent domain and whether the 
power has been properly delegated.  The eminent domain power is an 
aspect of sovereignty that allows federal or state governments to 
condemn property for public use so long as they pay just compensation.58  
The state holds the right of eminent domain, which it can delegate by 
statute to counties, municipalities, or public service corporations.  
“[T]here is a hierarchy among public entities . . . with the [s]tate at the 
top,” as to when they may use eminent domain to condemn land for 
incompatible public uses.59  The legislature may constitutionally delegate 
the eminent domain power to private development corporations “if a 
public purpose is thereby advanced, and the benefit of the property 
taken” is available to the public.60 
Eminent domain is a powerful tool for both governments and those 
to whom it delegates this power.  The concept of what constitutes a 
public use is very broad, but there are limitations on the delegation of 
power to private entities.  Even when states have not statutorily tightened 
the use of eminent domain by private entities after Kelo, courts will often 
strictly construe the statutory authority for delegation based on the grant 
of power and any procedural requirements governing the exercise of that 
power. 
II. USING INVERSE CONDEMNATION OR DAMAGINGS CLAIMS TO PAY 
FOR BURDENS CAUSED BY PROVIDING PUBLIC BENEFITS 
Assuming that the eminent domain power is for a public use and that 
the state has properly delegated this power to the public or private actor, 
there are consequences and responsibilities that come with using this 
power.  As our population grows and the consequences of climate change 
escalate, our infrastructure needs increase.  Various levels of government 
(federal, state, and local), private entities serving the public good, and 
private property owners have come into conflict over who will ultimately 
 
 56. Id. at 575 (footnote omitted). 
 57. Id. at 576. 
 58. See id. at 526. 
 59. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 23, Westlaw (database updated November 2019). 
 60. Id. § 28. 
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pay for these public needs. 
This Part discusses the responsibilities of governments and private 
entities holding the eminent domain power when they face state 
damagings and inverse condemnation claims.  For example, damaged 
landowners have sought recovery against electric utilities for causing 
wildfires61 or against public or private entities for flooding due to direct 
action or a failure to act.62  Disasters generate the need to compensate for 
damages to public and private property through tort liability, state 
damagings clauses, and insurance.  Other mechanisms exist to 
compensate for disasters, such as federal and state disaster relief, tax 
policy, victim compensation funds, employment laws, bankruptcy 
provisions, disaster loans or bonds, and charitable donations.63  However, 
this Article primarily addresses just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment, inverse condemnation and damagings under state law, tort 
liability, and insurance coverage. 
A. The Fifth Amendment, State Damaging Clauses, and Inverse 
Condemnation Claims 
We must answer the question of who will pay for the damage as we 
confront the increasing frequency and severity of disastrous events that 
test the sufficiency and resiliency of existing infrastructure.  With tort 
liability potentially subject to sovereign immunity, damaged landowners 
have turned to takings claims to require just compensation for 
government actions when their property rights are sacrificed for the 
public benefit.64  Damagings clauses developed in the 1800s following 
public infrastructure projects that damaged adjoining property without 
compensating landowners for a loss of access.  The 1823 Massachusetts 
 
 61. See, e.g., Barham v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 62. See, e.g., Arreola v. County of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (2002) (property owners 
sued the county and the water agency after the defendants failed to maintain property, causing a 
levee to break during a storm, which caused flooding). 
 63. See, e.g., Danshera Cords, Charitable Contributions for Disaster Relief: Rationalizing Tax 
Consequences and Victim Benefits, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 427 (2008); Nathan Smith, Comment, 
Water, Water Everywhere, and Not a Bite to Eat: Sovereign Immunity, Federal Disaster Relief, and 
Hurricane Katrina, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 699 (2006); Mark G. Jeffries, What To Do (and Not Do) 
When Disaster Strikes, 22 No. 2 W. VA. EMP. L. LETTER 1, 1 (2016) (discussing business obligations 
to employees when disaster hits a community under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the U.S. 
Department of Labor standards of practice); Francine J. Lipman, Anatomy of a Disaster Under the 
Internal Revenue Code, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 953 (2005); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts at 
Ground Zero, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 383 (2007) (discussing toxic tort claims for those exposed to toxic 
substances in and around Ground Zero). 
 64. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
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decision in Callender v. Marsh65 was “the original change-of-grade case, 
in which the cutting down of a street blocked an abutting owner’s access 
onto it.”66  The Callender court denied the landowner compensation for 
the loss of access because “no land had been touched.”67  This view of 
“no taking without a touching” was prevalent for over a hundred years 
and “the physical concept still exerts a heavy influence in some 
opinions” unless a state constitution or statute allows compensation for a 
“damaging.”68 
As the nation built freeways and highways across established road 
networks, this process created street closures, lack of access, or other 
street blockages, and “the long-range tendency of courts has been toward 
giving compensation on account of  unreasonable loss of access.”69  A 
similar situation involving riparian rights can arise where “the owner 
may suffer loss or diminution of [riparian rights] due to the acts of a 
body having eminent domain power.”70  In particular, many decisions 
have recognized that a taking might occur when the eminent domain 
entity blocks access, pollutes the water, changes the flow or level of the 
water, or restricts the riparian owner’s surface use.71  Some courts, 
however, use nuisance theory to analyze the problem or view the public 
body’s actions as exercising the police power.72 
Scholars and practitioners have mostly ignored the damagings 
clauses contained within many state constitutions or statutes until 
recently.73  Professor Brady takes a historical and comprehensive look at 
damagings clauses, contained in twenty-seven state constitutions: 
 More than half of the state constitutions contain a takings clause that 
is materially different from the federal one, in that it prohibits property 
from being both “taken” and “damaged” or “injured” for public use 
without just compensation.  Despite their ubiquity, these “damagings 
clauses” have received minimal attention in the literature on property 
law. . . . 
 . . . Studying the damagings clauses helps reveal a gap in the 
coverage of conventional condemnation law: in the process of building 
 
 65. 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823). 
 66. See Stoebuck, supra note 34, at 601. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 601–02. 
 69. Id. at 602. 
 70. Id. at 603. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Maureen E. Brady, The Damagings Clauses, 104 VA. L. REV. 341, 344 (2018). 
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and using something for public benefit, the government can drastically 
impair and devalue adjoining or nearby property, yet this is neither a 
physical taking (an actual appropriation of property) nor a regulatory 
taking (a regulation that so interferes with property rights that it 
triggers the just compensation requirement).  The damagings clauses 
were intended to cover these interstitial harms, those where nothing has 
been taken or regulated, but landowners are nonetheless unfairly 
burdened by a project for public benefit.  Despite the overwhelming 
evidence that the clauses were meant to cover these injuries, as time 
passed, state-court judges rendered the clauses fairly impotent.74 
In recent years, states have rejected most damagings claims except 
for those alleging a total loss of access or a physical invasion.75  States 
intended that damagings clauses would “cover these interstitial harms, 
those where nothing has been taken or regulated, but landowners are 
nonetheless unfairly burdened by a project for public benefit.”76  
Litigants damaged by floods or wildfires have increasingly turned to 
state inverse condemnation and damagings clauses to address 
government or private actions that were intended to benefit the public, 
but have instead damaged individual landowners.  The following 
discussion is not an exhaustive review of all recent cases, but it explores 
examples that address the gap in landowner remedies and provides 
insight into how existing damagings clauses or the Fifth Amendment 




 74. Id. at 344–46 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 75. Id. at 388–93 and accompanying notes; see also Padilla v. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris 
Cty., 497 S.W.3d 78, 84 (Tex. App. 2016) (holding that if property owner establishes that 
government “materially and substantially impaired access rights to his property,” the owner is 
entitled to compensation for lost profits arising from denial of access); In re Petition of Grand River 
Dam Auth., 484 P.2d 505, 512 (Okla. 1971) (“[W]here special damage results from injury which is 
different from that suffered by community in general, as where ingress or egress is cut off, or 
materially affected, action in nature of damages for reverse condemnation may be maintained . . . 
[even when] exercise of eminent domain is not involved . . . .” (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Ry. v. Terminal Oil Mill Co., P.2d 617 (Okla. 1937); Okla. Tpk. Auth. v. Chandler, 316 P.2d 828 
(Okla. 1957))); Schliem v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp., 888 N.W.2d 217, 224 (S.D. 2016) (noting 
“the drafters of South Dakota’s constitution added the words or damaged” to cover a situation when 
there was not an actual taking of the thing, but finding the property owner entitled to no 
compensation because he did not show that his access was destroyed or substantially impaired); 
SDS, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 978 So. 2d 1013, 1015 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (noting the 
Louisiana Constitution provides for compensation through inverse condemnation when a landowner 
suffers damage without expropriation).  
 76. See Brady, supra note 73, at 345–46. 
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1. Flooding 
Natural events such as hurricanes and super storms may cause 
massive flooding damages to private and public property, but “the 
armoring of rivers, hardening of floodplains, and development of 
watersheds increases the severity of the flood itself” and transforms these 
events into disasters.77  In spite of recognizing that human behavior in 
planning and developing land increases our vulnerability to disaster, we 
continue to build in areas that we know are at risk for natural events.78 
Those who have studied society’s response to addressing natural 
hazards, both before a disaster and after, have identified obstacles to 
reforming our policies based on set patterns of thinking and structures of 
government.79  For example, providing federal flood insurance to those 
living in floodplains and unable to obtain private insurance encourages 
development by underpricing risk.80  Recurring payments to address 
policyholder claims for flood damages encourage constant 
reconstruction.81  Even though communities “should carefully consider 
rebuilding in hazard-prone locations following disaster,”82 human 
societies have generally refused to relocate.83  As victims of disasters and 
climate change seek damages to address recurring losses, “we can no 
longer afford to simply build and rebuild in a continuing cycle of 
destruction.”84 
State courts, the Federal Court of Claims, the Federal Circuit, and the 
Supreme Court continue to struggle with developing a coherent and 
consistent approach to resolving past and future flooding claims 
involving hydro-infrastructure.  Some states require negligence or 
nuisance by the public or private entity providing a public benefit before 
giving a landowner remedy for damagings.  Other states, including 
California, use strict liability under a constitutional standard rather than a 
 
 77. Justin Pidot, Deconstructing Disaster, 2013 BYU L. REV. 213, 214–16 (discussing the 
history of disaster policy and society’s response as we continue to build and rebuild physical 
infrastructure in hazardous locations). 
 78. Id. at 215–17 (“Within Florida, development is concentrated in counties facing particularly 
acute hurricane risks.”). 
 79. Id. at 218–19 (identifying and discussing three categories of obstacles—symbolic, 
cognitive, and structural). 
 80. Id. at 219 (discussing impact of National Flood Insurance Program on development). 
 81. Id. at 220. 
 82. Id. (citing Lisa Grow Sun, Smart Growth in Dumb Places: Sustainability, Disaster, and the 
Future of the American City, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2157 (2011)). 
 83. Id. (“Between the twelfth century and the nineteenth century, only forty-two cities 
worldwide were permanently abandoned following catastrophe.”). 
 84. Id. at 224. 
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tort standard, but temper this liability with a reasonableness rule for 
claims based on public flood control programs.  Damagings cases often 
result from city infrastructure that fails for lack of maintenance or 
because of an overload to the infrastructure caused by extreme weather.  
More recently, “failure to adapt” litigation has tested the legal 
responsibilities of government and private owners of energy 
infrastructure to prepare for extreme weather events and reform 
constitutional, tort, and statutory law to reduce climate change related 
risks.85 
a. Tort or Taking in the Federal Courts? 
The Federal Circuit has distinguished between a tort and a taking to 
find that while government inaction may be the basis for a tort claim, a 
takings claim requires affirmative government action.  In St. Bernard 
Parish Government v. United States, property owners in St. Bernard 
Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward of the City of New Orleans alleged a 
taking against the federal government.86  The plaintiffs based their suit 
on the theory that “government inaction, including the failure to properly 
maintain or to modify the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (‘MRGO’) 
channel, and government action (the construction and operation of the 
MRGO channel)” caused flood damage to their properties from 
Hurricane Katrina and other hurricanes.87  The Court of Federal Claims 
held that a taking occurred and awarded the property owners just 
compensation.88  However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
reversed the takings win for the owners, holding that “the government 
cannot be liable on a takings theory for inaction and that the government 
action in constructing and operating MRGO was not shown to have been 
the cause of the flooding.”89 
The Federal Circuit in St. Bernard Parish relied on Arkansas Game 
& Fish Commission v. United States90 and United States v. 
 
 85. Dena Adler, Turning the Tide in Coastal and Riverine Energy Infrastructure Adaptation: 
Can an Emerging Wave of Litigation Advance Preparation for Climate Change?, 4 OIL & GAS, 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 519, 520 (2018). 
 86. 887 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert denied sub nom. St. Bernard Par. v. United 
States, 139 S. Ct. 796 (2019) (mem.). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 568 U.S. 23, 27–28 (2012) (finding that an affirmative government action in releasing water 
may give rise to a temporary takings claim). 
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Sponenbarger91 to find “that takings liability does not arise from 
government inaction or failure to act” and that “[p]laintiffs’ sole remedy 
for these inactions, if any, lies in tort.”92  The St. Bernard Parish court 
explained that while a government failure “to maintain or modify a 
government-constructed project may state a tort claim,” a takings claim 
requires affirmative government acts and, unlike a tort claim, the 
government’s takings liability does not depend on its level of care.93  St. 
Bernard Parish filed a Petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme 
Court denied on January 7, 2019 without comment.94  Some argue that 
because the Court’s decision in Arkansas Game reversed the Federal 
Circuit’s adoption of a categorical rule “that the Government is always 
immune from takings liability for inaction,” the St. Bernard Parish 
decision was incorrect in relying on Arkansas Game for its holding that 
only government action creates takings liability.95  While there is support 
for holding the government liable for taking private property based on 
government inaction, the Supreme Court may not definitively answer the 
issue for years. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Arkansas Game concluded that 
“government-induced flooding can constitute a taking of property”96 and 
that recurrent floodings, even if temporary, “are not categorically exempt 
from Takings Clause liability.”97  In remanding the takings claim, the 
Court noted that the Federal Circuit should also examine Arkansas water-
rights law in resolving the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission’s claim 
that flooding authorized by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers damaged 
or destroyed timber on forestland it owned and managed.98 
Guided by the Court’s decision in Arkansas Game, the Federal Court 
of Claims in In re Upstream Addicks & Barker (Texas) Flood-Control 
Reservoirs addressed property owner claims against the government for 
flooding that occurred after Hurricane Harvey in August 2017.99  
Thousands of homes and businesses in the Houston, Texas area were 
 
 91. 308 U.S. 256, 265 (1939) (“When undertaking to safeguard a large area from existing flood 
hazards, the Government does not owe compensation under the Fifth Amendment to every 
landowner which it fails to or cannot protect.”). 
 92. St. Bernard Par., 887 F.3d at 1361–62. 
 93. Id. at 1360. 
 94. See St. Bernard Par. v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 796 (2019). 
 95. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1–2, St. Bernard Par., 139 S. Ct. 796 (2019) (mem.) (No. 
18-359) (citing Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012)). 
 96. 568 U.S. 23, 34 (2012). 
 97. Id. at 27. 
 98. Id. at 26, 38. 
 99. 138 Fed. Cl. 658, 660–61 (2018). 
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flooded, including over 10,000 private properties “upstream of the 
federally designed, built, and maintained Addicks and Barker Dams.”100  
The upstream landowners brought suit “alleging an uncompensated 
taking under the Fifth Amendment.”101  The court examined the 
sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ takings claims in Upstream Addicks and 
explained that courts assess takings claims on the particular facts of each 
case.102  A takings claim based on a temporary physical invasion is 
“subject to a more complex balancing process to determine whether” a 
taking occurred.103 
For flooding cases, there are five factors relevant to whether the 
government’s actions constituted a compensable taking of property: (1) 
“time—the duration of the physical invasion”; (2) “causation”; (3) 
“intent or foreseeability”; (4) “the owner’s reasonable investment-backed 
expectations regarding the land’s use”; and (5) the “[s]everity of the 
interference.”104  Finally, plaintiffs bringing inverse condemnation claims 
from government-induced flooding must show that “treatment under 
takings law, as opposed to tort law, is appropriate under the 
circumstances.”105  Claims against the United States “sounding in tort” 
lack jurisdiction under the Tucker Act because they are not takings 
claims founded on the Fifth Amendment.106 
In addressing the federal government’s claim that the plaintiffs could 
not state a takings claim based on government inaction, the Upstream 
Addicks court noted that “[t]he government acted when it built and then 
modified the dams in such a way that they could and did impound storm 
water behind the dams on both government and private property.”107  The 
court held that plaintiffs adequately alleged government action sufficient 
for a taking claim based on the government’s intent and foreseeability of 
the alleged takings.108  The government was aware of the risks posed to 
private property by the dams’ designs and knew how it could mitigate 
those risks.109 
 
 100. Id. at 661. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 664. 
 103. Id. (quoting Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
2013)). 
 104. Id. at 665 (quoting Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 586 U.S. 23, 38–39 
(2012)). 
 105. Id. (quoting Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).  
 106. Id. (quoting Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 107. Id. at 666. 
 108. Id. at 667. 
 109. Id. 
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In a subsequent federal lawsuit against the Army Corps of Engineers 
(Corps), farmers, landowners, and business owners claimed that the 
Corps’ actions on the Missouri River “resulted in the taking of flowage 
easements on their properties without just compensation.”110 The Corps 
was obligated to make changes to the Missouri River to protect fish and 
wildlife species, which allegedly caused increased flooding of the private 
property.111  The court in Ideker Farms found that although many of the 
plaintiffs had shown causation and foreseeability in several of the 
flooding incidents from 2007 to 2014, they failed to prove causation for 
the flooding in 2011.112  The plaintiffs’ allegations that the Corps’ failure 
to release water from the reservoirs caused the flooding sounded in tort 
based on government inaction and the St. Bernard Parish decision 
clearly established that inaction cannot support a takings claim.113  The 
government argued that the plaintiffs did not prove that the Missouri 
River System and the flood reduction actions caused the flooding, but the 
court noted that its earlier findings did not support the government’s 
argument.114  In view of the decision in St. Bernard Parish, the court 
denied both the plaintiffs’ and the government’s motions for 
reconsideration.115 
Following the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Arkansas Game that 
“government-induced flooding can constitute a taking of property,”116  
Federal Claims and Federal Circuit decisions have distinguished between 
flooding claims alleging damage based on government inaction and 
flooding claims based on government acts.  Government inaction can 
only be addressed using tort, while government action may support a 
takings claim.  As discussed above, the Court’s denial of certiorari for 
the Federal Circuit’s decision in St. Bernard Parish leaves litigants 
uncertain as to whether government inaction may serve as the basis for a 
takings claim. 
 
 110. Ideker Farms, Inc. v. United States, 142 Fed. Cl. 222, 223 (2019). 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 224–25. 
 113. Id. at 231. 
 114. Id. at 232 (“[C]hanges made to the Corps’ River and Mainstem system after the court order 
requiring the Corps’ compliance with the [Endangered Species Act] increased flooding to a degree 
that would not have been contemplated when the River and Mainstem System structures were 
planned.”). 
 115. Id. at 228. 
 116. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 34 (2012). 
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b. Tort or Taking in the State Courts? 
States have offered different rationales to determine whether public 
or private entities acting for the public benefit are immune from tort 
liability for private property damages or whether an inverse 
condemnation claim requires a finding of negligence or nuisance.117  The 
Arkansas Supreme Court in Robinson v. City of Ashdown noted “courts 
have not been clear in presenting their rationales in cases where statutes 
conferring immunity from tort liability upon municipalities have been 
held inapplicable to facts which amount to negligence or nuisance.”118 
Determined to make its rationale clear, the Robinson court found the 
City of Ashdown liable for failing to remedy its sewer plant operation 
that caused sewage overflow.119  It relied on the Arkansas constitutional 
provision that “private property shall not be taken, appropriated, or 
damaged for public use, without just compensation.”120  The court 
declared, “When a municipality acts in a manner which substantially 
diminishes the value of a landowner’s land, and its actions are shown to 
be intentional, it cannot escape its constitutional obligation to 
compensate for a taking of property on the basis of its immunity from 
tort action.”121  The Arkansas Supreme Court thus explicitly based its 
finding of liability for inverse condemnation actions on the damagings 
clause in its constitution, not on negligence or nuisance. 
Other states have been less clear in distinguishing between tort and 
inverse condemnation.  For example, Utah law specifically precludes 
recovery of property damages caused by negligence in an action for 
inverse condemnation.122  Utah’s Constitution provides that “[p]rivate 
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation,”123 which allows a property owner to bring an inverse 
condemnation action for damages so long as the elements of a property 
interest, a takings or damaging, and a public use are met.124  The Utah 
Supreme Court in Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. Bountiful 
 
 117. See Robinson v. City of Ashdown, 783 S.W.2d 53, 55–56 (Ark. 1990) (citing A. W. Gans, 
Annotation, Damage to Private Property Caused by Negligence of Governmental Agents as 
“Taking,” “Damage,” or “Use” for Public Purposes, in Constitutional Sense, 2 A.L.R.2d 677 
(1948)). 
 118. Id. at 56. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (quoting ARK. CONST. art. II, § 22).  
 121. Id. at 56–57. 
 122. See Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 49 P.2d 405, 407 (Utah 1935). 
 123. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 124. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243–44 (Utah 1990). 
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City held that “under [Utah] statutes and case law, damages which are 
not a direct and necessary consequence of the construction or operation 
of a public use are not recoverable in an inverse condemnation action.”125  
Because there was “no evidence that the injuries incurred by Farmers 
were unavoidable or necessary to the construction or use of the culvert,” 
Farmers’ claim for damage caused by losing lateral support when 
Bountiful City constructed a culvert for flood control was not 
recoverable under inverse condemnation.126  Instead, the “damages must 
‘grow out of’ a public use rather than being merely the result of a 
negligent or wrongful government act,” and the injuries Farmers 
experienced did not provide any public benefit.127  This rule requires the 
government to pay inverse condemnation damages only when it is not at 
fault, not regardless of fault.  In Utah, if there is fault on the part of the 
government, the injured property owner must present a tort claim, not an 
inverse condemnation claim. 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has taken a different approach.  
In Wilkie v. City of Boiling Spring Lakes, the court determined that the 
City of Boiling Spring Lakes’ action in raising the lake level for private 
landowners surrounding the lake, causing flooding to the plaintiffs’ 
property, was a compensable inverse condemnation claim.128  The court 
explained: 
Although a condemning entity must establish that a proposed taking 
will further a public purpose before a condemnation can be authorized, 
we can see no reason why a reciprocal burden to establish the existence 
of a public purpose should be imposed upon a property owner who has 
been deprived of his or her property by governmental action taken for a 
non-public purpose.129 
Thus, while Utah required inverse condemnation damages to “‘grow out 
of’ a public use rather than being merely the result of a negligent or 
wrongful government act,”130  North Carolina concluded that the 
statutory inverse condemnation remedy under state law does not depend 
on the purpose that led to the property owner’s injury.  The court 
determined that “it makes no sense” to provide just compensation only 
 
 125. Id. at 1245. 
 126. Id. at 1246. 
 127. Id. (quoting Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 349 P.2d 157, 166 (1960) (Wade, J., 
concurring)). 
 128. 809 S.E.2d 853, 861 (N.C. 2018). 
 129. Id. at 862. 
 130. Farmers New World Life, 803 P.2d at 1246. 
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“if the government does the right thing but not if it does the wrong 
thing.”131 
Texas requires that inverse condemnation claims based on flooding 
be permanent in nature and result from intentional government action.132  
Recurrent flooding events are a prerequisite to finding a taking as Texas 
courts struggle in separating tort claims from inverse condemnation 
claims.133  In Tarrant Regional Water District v. Gragg, the court drew 
the line between “liability for something less than intentional behavior,” 
which would immunize an entity against negligence, and situations 
where “the requisite intent is present when a governmental entity knows 
that a specific act is causing identifiable harm or knows that the harm is 
substantially certain to result.”134  The court required evidence of 
recurrent flooding and noted that while a single flood event may cause 
damage, it “does not generally rise to the level of a taking.”135 
In Harris County, Texas, the county created and adopted a flood-
control plan in 1984 that was never fully implemented and subsequent 
flooding affected 400 homeowners in residential communities located in 
the upper White Oak Bayou watershed in 1998, 2001, and 2002.136  The 
affected homeowners sued the county for approving upstream 
development and failing to implement the 1984 flood control plan.137  
The Texas Supreme Court in Harris County Flood Control District v. 
Kerr held that the government did not take the “homeowners’ property 
by approving private development without fully implementing a 
previously approved flood-control plan.”138  It noted that the 
homeowners’ nuisance claim is dependent on the takings claim.139  If the 
plaintiffs cannot establish a constitutional taking, the government is 
immune from the nuisance claim.140  The Harris County court explained 
 
 131. Wilkie, 809 S.E.2d at 862 (quoting Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 
813 (Tex. 2016) (Lehrmann, J., concurring)). 
 132. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546, 555, 557–58 (Tex. 2004) (upholding 
the “trial court’s finding that the reservoir’s construction and operation intensified flooding at the 
Ranch” and finding that recurring flooding requirement “assures that the government is not held 
liable for taking property when a project’s adverse impacts, and by implication its benefit to the 
public, are too temporal or speculative to warrant compensation”). 
 133. Id. at 554–56 (“The cases reflect our efforts to account for several concerns in drawing the 
line between mere negligence and an unconstitutional taking.”). 
 134. Id. at 554–55. 
 135. Id. at 555. 
 136. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 795–96 (Tex. 2016). 
 137. Id. at 796–97. 
 138. Id. at 795. 
 139. Id. at 795 n.1. 
 140. Id. 
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that in order for plaintiffs to prevail on a takings claim under the Texas 
Constitution, they must prove that the government “intentionally took or 
damaged their property for public use, or was substantially certain that 
would be the result.”141  The failure to implement the flood control plan 
was inaction that did not support a takings claim because it was “not a 
case where the government made a conscious decision to subject 
particular properties to inundation so that other properties would be 
spared.”142  The takings claim must result from an affirmative act of the 
government—nonfeasance will not support a takings claim.143 
Illinois appears to accept inverse condemnation claims for 
government actions that damage private property owners without relying 
on tort concepts.  However, it does require a showing of “radical 
interference with a private property owner’s use and enjoyment of the 
property,” which sounds in the tort of nuisance.144  For example, the 
Illinois Supreme Court in Hampton v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation 
District recognized that “[t]he takings clause of the Illinois Constitution 
provides greater protection for property owners than its counterpart in the 
United States Constitution, because it provides a remedy for property 
that is damaged, in addition to property that is taken.”145  The plaintiffs 
alleged that flooding after a rainstorm damaged their properties because 
the water district diverted stormwater into nearby creeks, resulting in the 
creeks overtopping their banks and the sewers backing up.146  The court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged a taking under 
Illinois law because they did not allege “that the flooding ‘radically 
interfered’ with plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their properties.”147 
Virginia allows inverse condemnation for damages caused by a 
single occurrence of flooding.148  Similarly, Washington allows an 
inverse condemnation action without the government exercising its 
power of eminent domain and holds the government liable for flooding 
damages “if it concentrates and gathers water into artificial drains or 
 
 141. Id. at 799 (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 808 (Tex. 2005)). 
 142. Id. at 807. 
 143. Id. at 800. 
 144. Hampton v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., 57 N.E.3d 1229, 1238–39 (Ill. 2016). 
 145. Id. at 1240. 
 146. Id. at 1232–33. 
 147. Id. at 1240–41 (reversing and remanding to allow the parties to brief issues surrounding 
damage claim, recognizing that “[t]he Illinois takings clause provides that the owner of damaged 
property has a right to just compensation”). 
 148. Livingston v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 726 S.E.2d 264, 271 (Va. 2012) (holding that a single 
occurrence of flooding may give rise to compensable damaging, but only if it is foreseeable and a 
result of human agency, not natural causes). 
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channels and discharges it upon adjoining lands in quantities greater than 
or in a manner different from the natural flow.”149 
In contrast to those states requiring negligence or nuisance, 
California’s constitutional damagings provision as interpreted by the 
California Supreme Court does not require fault.150  However, flooding 
claims differ from wildfire claims in California courts, which have 
instituted a reasonableness standard in flooding cases.  In Arreola v. 
County of Monterey, the court explained the legal background for an 
inverse condemnation action as follows: 
“Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when 
just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been 
paid to, or into court for, the owner.”  When a public use results in 
damage to private property without having been preceded by just 
compensation, the property owner may proceed against the public 
entity to recover it.  Such a cause of action is denominated “inverse 
condemnation.”151 
The court noted that an earlier California Supreme Court case, Albers v. 
County of Los Angeles, confirmed that the state constitutional provision 
was not just an exception to governmental immunity, but instead 
“provided a broader basis for governmental liability.”152 
The Arreola court cited Albers’s confirmation “that the fundamental 
policy basis for the constitutional requirement of just compensation is a 
consideration of ‘whether the owner of the damaged property if 
uncompensated would contribute more than his proper share to the public 
undertaking.’”153  The only requirements for an inverse condemnation 
claim were that “(1) the injuries must be physical injuries of real 
property, and (2) the injuries must have been proximately caused by the 
public improvement as deliberately constructed and planned.”154 
The Arreola court identified two exceptions to the rule that the 
“inverse condemnation plaintiff was entitled to compensation without 
regard to fault.”155  First, the Gray exception does not require 
compensation for damage inflicted in the proper exercise of the police 
 
 149. Dickgieser v. State, 105 P.3d 26, 28, 33 (Wash. 2005) (en banc). 
 150. See Joyce S. Mendlin & Roger M. Rosen, Obtaining Recovery for Property Damage 
Through Inverse Condemnation, 33 L.A. LAW. 20, 20 (2011). 
 151. 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 49–50 (Ct. App. 2002) (first quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; and 
then quoting Breidert v. S. Pac. Co., 394 P.2d 719, 721 n.1 (1964)). 
 152. Id. at 50 (citing Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 398 P.2d 129, 137 (Cal. 1965)). 
 153. Id. (quoting Albers, 398 P.2d at 136). 
 154. Id. (citing Holtz v. Superior Court, 475 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1970)). 
 155. Id. (citing Albers, 398 P.2d at 136–37). 
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power.156  Second, the Archer exception does not require an upper 
riparian proprietor to pay compensation for damages it has a right to 
inflict under the common enemy doctrine to protect his or her own 
property.157  The California Supreme Court in Belair v. Riverside County 
Flood Control District balanced the conflicting concerns under the 
Albers rule of strict liability and the Archer exception in a case involving 
flood damage that occurred after a levee failed.158  The Belair court 
determined that the Albers rule would discourage needed flood control 
projects, while the Archer exception would unfairly burden the private 
landowner, holding: 
[W]here the public agency’s design, construction or maintenance of a 
flood control project is shown to have posed an unreasonable risk of 
harm to the plaintiffs, and such unreasonable design, construction or 
maintenance constituted a substantial cause of the damages, plaintiffs 
may recover regardless of the fact that the project’s purpose is to 
contain the “common enemy” of floodwaters.159 
The Arreola court explained that “[u]nder Belair, the public entity is not 
immune from suit, but neither is it strictly liable.”160  The California 
Supreme Court later considered six factors, the “Locklin factors,” to 
determine reasonableness in an inverse condemnation action.161  After 
examining California’s inverse condemnation law, particularly as to 
matters involving flood control projects, the Arreola court stated, “[T]he 
public entity will be liable in inverse condemnation if its design, 
construction, or maintenance of a public improvement poses an 
unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiffs’ property, and the 
unreasonable aspect of the improvement is a substantial cause of 
damage.”162 
The Arreola court applied these rules to the action filed by plaintiffs 
against Santa Cruz, Monterey County Water Resource Agency, and 
Monterey for failing to keep the channel clear and causing a levee to fail 
during the storm.163  The court found “that the trial court appropriately 
assessed the reasonableness of [the Counties’ long-standing policy of 
 
 156. Albers, 398 P.2d at 136–37 (citing Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 163 P. 1024, 1033 
(Cal. 1917)). 
 157. Id. at 135, 137 (citing Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 119 P.2d 1, 4–5 (Cal. 1941)). 
 158. 764 P.2d 1070, 1079 (Cal. 1988). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Arreola, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51. 
 161. Id. (citing Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 867 P.2d 724, 750 (Cal. 1994)). 
 162. Id. (finding unreasonableness should be determined using the Locklin balancing factors). 
 163. Id. at 44. 
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allowing the Pajaro River Levee Project channel to deteriorate] 
according to the factors set forth in Locklin,”164 and affirmed that the 
defendants were “liable in tort and inverse condemnation for extensive 
damage caused when the [Project] failed during a heavy rainstorm.”165  
The State of California was also liable in tort and inverse condemnation 
for higher flood levels and associated damages from its design and 
construction of Highway 1, which obstructed the flow of floodwater to 
the sea, and for the drainage culverts that were insufficient to drain the 
flood.166 
Over time, the California Supreme Court developed its approach to 
inverse condemnation claims for property damages from publicly 
managed flood control projects under article 1, section 19 of the 
California Constitution.167  The court in Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water 
District explained the law’s development beginning with the historical 
analysis of inverse condemnation liability based on “traditional tort and 
property law concepts.”168  As discussed briefly above, the Albers 
decision “shifted the focus in inverse condemnation cases from the 
common law to the Constitution.”169 
Later, the Locklin decision endorsed and refined the reasonableness 
standard from the Belair decision by developing balancing principles 
such that a public entity is liable for the damage caused by its actions 
only if its conduct is unreasonable and a substantial cause of the 
damage.170  The resulting inverse condemnation rule for public flood 
control works that cause damage to private property does not require 
fault or negligence under tort law, but instead “requires a balancing of 
the public need for flood control against the gravity of harm caused by 
unnecessary damage to private property.”171 
California inverse condemnation law recognizes strict liability, 
tempered by reasonableness and a balancing of private and public 
interests for public flood control projects.172  It precludes the public or 
 
 164. Id. at 53. 
 165. Id. at 44. 
 166. Id. at 60. 
 167. Belair v. Riverside Cty. Flood Control Dist., 764 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Cal. 1988) (quoting 
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 168. 935 P.2d 796, 800 (Cal. 1997). 
 169. Id. (quoting Belair, 764 P.2d at 1077). 
 170. Id. at 797. 
 171. Id. at 798. 
 172. See Biron v. City of Redding, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 848, 855 (2014) (applying a reasonableness 
standard to determine the City of Redding’s inverse condemnation liability and finding that nature, 
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private entity defendant from using traditional tort defenses such as 
governmental immunity and comparative negligence.173  California 
courts have developed this standard without relying on fault or 
negligence under tort law, but they require a reasonableness inquiry that 
appears to resort to nuisance law by balancing the utility of the conduct 
against the gravity of the harm.174  However, in two California cases 
decided after Bunch, Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego175 and Pacific 
Shores Property Owners Ass’n v. Department of Fish & Wildlife,176 the 
appellate court did not apply a nuisance-like balancing test and instead 
relied on strict liability. 
In Pacific Bell, a private landowner sued the City of San Diego for 
tort and inverse condemnation for flooding damages caused by a burst 
water pipe that was part of the City’s firefighting equipment.177  Noting 
that the City was immune under the Tort Claims Act for injuries caused 
by firefighting equipment, the court made it clear that “the immunities 
provided by the Tort Claims Act do not insulate a public entity from 
liability for inverse condemnation.”178  The court applied the 
fundamental policy underlying eminent domain law “that the costs of a 
public improvement benefiting the community should be spread among 
those benefited rather than allocated to a single member of the 
community.”179  This policy echoes the purpose of the Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause that is “designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”180 
A subsequent inverse condemnation action decided by the same 
California appellate district in Pacific Shores applied strict liability to a 
landowner’s claim that a state agency was liable for a physical taking 
when it intentionally caused flooding.181  The agency had assumed 
control of a local flood control process and provided less flood protection 
than it previously provided in order to protect the environment.182  
 
and not the City, was the cause of the flooding). 
 173. See id. at 1272–73. 
 174. See Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 867 P.2d 724, 749 (Cal. 1994). 
 175. 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897 (Ct. App. 2000). 
 176. 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Ct. App. 2016). 
 177. 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901. 
 178. Id. at 904.  
 179. Id. at 903 (citing Belair v. Riverside Cty. Flood Control Dist., 764 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Cal. 
1988)). 
 180. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 181. 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 99. 
 182. Id.  
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However, not all California courts have allowed inverse condemnation 
claims when public actions damage private property.  In claims alleging 
property damage from general public works, supplying drinking water, 
or enforcement action in pursuit of a suspect, the courts have rejected 
inverse condemnation claims.183 
It is difficult to discern any particular pattern with inverse 
condemnation claims in flooding cases as they vary widely among the 
states.  The four major distinctions appear to be: 
• Does an inverse condemnation claim require a showing of public 
use or that the government exercised its eminent domain 
power?184 
• Does an inverse condemnation claim require a showing of 
negligence or nuisance?185 
• Does an inverse condemnation claim for flooding require 
recurrent and permanent flooding?186 
• Does an inverse condemnation claim require a showing of an 
intentional government action?187 
c. Takings Liability for Government Inaction? 
In contrast to the federal decisions and some state decisions 
discussed above, some state courts have held the government liable for 
 
 183. See, e.g., City of Oroville v. Superior Court, 446 P.3d 304, 307 (Cal. 2019) (concluding that 
the City of Oroville was not liable in inverse condemnation for the City’s sewer system failure that 
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232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 356, 366 (Ct. App. 2018) (refusing to find inverse condemnation liability for 
government actions taken to replace or repair the water or water supply system provided to residents 
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property in actions intended either for a public use or not for a public use. 
 185. Arkansas differentiates tort claims from inverse condemnation claims, but Utah requires 
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damagings claims, particularly for wildfire damages, its flooding decisions require a reasonableness 
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gravity of the harm. 
 186. Illinois requires a showing of intense or radical interference with use and enjoyment of 
property, Texas requires permanent flooding, and Virginia allows inverse condemnation for damages 
caused by a single occurrence of flooding. 
 187. Arkansas and Texas require that inverse condemnation claims based on flooding need to 
result from intentional government action, while Virginia recognizes that government inaction can 
support an inverse condemnation claim when there is a duty to act. 
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takings caused by government inaction.188  For example, in Livingston v. 
Virginia Department of Transportation, the Virginia Supreme Court 
recognized that government inaction, such as failing to remove 
accumulated sediment in a relocated water channel, can support an 
inverse condemnation claim when there is a duty to act.189  However, two 
dissenting justices in Livingston called the inverse condemnation claim 
based on inaction a “constitutional tort” based on a theory of causation 
and not an exercise of eminent domain.190  Reflecting the tension 
between identifying damaging government actions as tort or inverse 
condemnation, the dissent argued: 
 Boiled down to its essence, Plaintiffs allege that [the Virginia 
Department of Transportation (VDOT)] had a duty under the law to 
dredge or otherwise maintain Cameron Run, and its failure to do so 
caused the flood damage to their properties.  This claim is nothing more 
than a claim for negligence, brought under the guise of the 
constitutional damaging clause.  While it is true that a governmental 
entity, such as VDOT, may commit acts of negligence in exercising its 
power of eminent domain, the acts of negligence alone do not 
constitute a constitutional taking or damaging.  It is the exercise of the 
power of eminent domain that gives rise to a claim of constitutional 
taking or damaging.  In fact, “we have consistently adhered to the view 
that the eminent domain provisions in the Virginia Constitution have no 
application to tortious or unlawful conduct.”191 
In Maryland, the Court of Appeals in Litz v. Maryland Department of 
the Environment followed decisions in Florida and California that held 
the government liable for taking private property when landowners lost 
private property by either government inaction or affirmative 
government action.192  The court in Litz held that the government’s 
“failure to act, in the face of an affirmative duty to act,” supported an 
inverse condemnation claim because the city and state knew about a 
sewage overflow that polluted Litz’s campground recreational lake, but 
did nothing to prevent the contamination.193  New Mexico and Arkansas 
 
 188. See, e.g., Livingston v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 726 S.E.2d 264, 275 (Va. 2012). 
 189. Id. (“[T]he government cannot evade liability for a damaging under Article I, Section 11 by 
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 190. Id. at 277 (McClanahan, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no cause of action for inverse 
condemnation without the exercise of [eminent domain] power.”). 
 191. Id. at 279 (McClanahan, J., dissenting) (quoting State Highway & Transp. Comm’r of Va. 
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 193. Id. at 931–33. 
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have similarly found the government liable for a taking of property when 
the government intentionally failed to act in light of the foreseeable harm 
to private property.194 
Federal, state, and local governments that fail to enforce existing 
regulations should be subject to takings liability when non-enforcement 
results in damages to private landowners.195  If the Takings Clause was 
intended to “bar [g]overnment from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole,”196 isn’t the state allocating “property rights when it 
chooses not to enforce existing property laws”197 such as the flood 
control plan?  Holding the government or a private company liable for 
takings based on inaction when they are responsible for providing service 
to the public may give public entities an incentive to act affirmatively in 
the face of public need rather than decline to act for fear of liability.198 
When state or local governments fail to address sea-level rise 
through regulation or take adaptive measures to avoid takings liability, 
they forego the opportunity to protect their communities against 
inevitable disaster.199  However, thus far, attempts to hold the 
government responsible for failing to respond to known dangers that may 
impact people and property have been largely unsuccessful. 
2. Wildfires 
Like flooding, wildfires are extremely costly to human life, wildlife, 
property, and the environment.200  Climate change will increase the 
 
 194. See Electro-Jet Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Albuquerque, 845 P.2d 770, 777 (N.M. 1992) (holding 
that the government must compensate when it foresees the risk of damage to the owner’s property or 
where such risk is so obvious that its incurrence is “the deliberate infliction of harm for the purpose 
of carrying out the governmental project”); Robinson v. City of Ashdown, 783 S.W.2d 53, 56–57 
(Ark. 1990) (upholding a claim against the City of Ashdown for failing to properly pump sewage 
that ended up in owner’s home, explaining that if the government “acts in a manner which 
substantially diminishes the value of a landowner’s land, and its actions are shown to be intentional, 
it cannot escape its constitutional obligation to compensate for a taking of property on the basis of its 
immunity from tort action”). 
 195. Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, 59 B.C. L. REV. 145, 183 (2018). 
 196. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 197. Mulvaney, supra note 195, at 184. 
 198. See Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 
113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 347 (2014) (“[F]orcing the government to pay for its regulatory actions but 
not its omissions will have the perverse effect of deterring the government from doing anything at 
all, even if a regulatory response could dramatically increase overall societal well-being.”). 
 199. Id. at 348 (“The category of passive takings . . . creates an important counterbalance to the 
threat of traditional takings liability and encourages governments to reduce the overall costs of sea-
level rise.”). 
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frequency and severity of wildfires and require even greater efforts to 
suppress, fight, and pay for the aftermath.  While federal and state 
agencies provide the major suppression and firefighting resources, local 
government, landowners, insurance companies, and the courts must 
respond to damages incurred in either suppressing fires or recovering 
after the fires.  For example, setting backfires is a firefighting tool that 
uses an intentionally-set fire to fight an out-of-control wildfire by 
eliminating a fuel source in the predicted path of the wildfire.201  These 
backfires, while sometimes effective, are risky and may cause substantial 
damage to property and the environment.202 
Assigning financial responsibility for the decisions made by the 
government in fire suppression and firefighting will necessarily impact 
the alignment of incentives among firefighters and landowners.203  As 
Professor Karen Bradshaw explains: 
 The government is typically found liable for wildfire damage caused 
through its actions as a land manager, but is not liable when it acts in its 
firefighting capacity.  This is best illustrated through a series of 
examples.  If the government starts a controlled burn that happens to 
spread to adjacent privately-owned property, it is liable for the damage 
caused.  In such instances, the government is held liable under the same 
standards as would apply to a private citizen.  If the government acts as 
a decision-maker, however, rather than in its capacity as a landowner, 
sovereign immunity applies.  Courts afford government firefighting 
agencies complete, unreviewable discretion to decide how or whether 
to fight wildfire; private parties may not recover later even if the 
decisions were shown to be erroneous.204 
Professor Bradshaw concludes “tort liability provides an insufficient 
shield against the excessive use of backfire.”205 
Inverse condemnation or damagings claims offer an alternative to 
tort liability and align government incentives to act for the public benefit, 
while also taking into account those individuals and entities who suffer 
the greatest burdens.  Privately held public utilities may also be liable 
under inverse condemnation or damaging clauses for actions taken that 
benefit the public.  These utilities in turn assert that they cannot spread 
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the risk through taxes and face the same insurance policy exclusions for 
inverse condemnation claims.  Southern California Edison and Pacific 
Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) are facing lawsuits from property 
owners in California whose homes were lost in fires attributed to private 
utility power lines.206 
The liability standard for wildfire inverse condemnation claims in 
California is strict liability,207 even though California rejected the strict 
liability rule in the public flood control context.208  In Pacific Bell 
Telephone Co. v. Southern California Edison Co., the court affirmed the 
trial court’s conclusion that Edison “may be liable as a public entity in 
inverse condemnation.”209  Pacific Bell sued Edison in inverse 
condemnation for burn damages to its telephone cables caused by a 
ground fault from Edison’s equipment that sent electricity through 
Pacific Bell’s underground telephone cables.210  In addition to its 
unsuccessful argument that it could not be liable under inverse 
condemnation as a private entity, Edison argued that the court should 
apply a reasonableness standard used in inverse condemnation claims 
arising from flood control projects.211  The Pacific Bell court concluded 
that while the California Supreme Court applies a reasonableness test in 
the flood control context, “there is no indication from these cases that the 
Supreme Court intended to replace the strict liability standard in inverse 
condemnation cases outside the flood control context.”212 
California legislators have considered changing the liability standard 
for inverse condemnation claims against electric utility companies after a 
wildfire.213  The existing liability standard holds utility companies liable 
for “costs related to a wildfire involving its equipment, even when the 
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company followed all existing safety regulations.”214  In 2018, then-
Governor Jerry Brown proposed giving courts discretion in assessing 
liability to “‘balance the public benefit’ of the utility company’s services 
to consumers with the ‘harm caused to private property.’”215  Instead, the 
legislature enacted Senate Bill 901, signed by Brown on September 21, 
2018, which provided funds of $1 billion over five years for fire-
protection efforts and regulatory relief to reduce financial exposure for 
utility companies.216  Not surprisingly, a federal study confirmed that the 
more than 1.8 million acres of California burned by wildfire in 2018 was 
the highest in California’s recorded history and worse than any other 
state.217 
In 2019, California again considered efforts to reduce wildfires and 
save utilities with Governor Gavin Newsom “asking the California 
Legislature to extend an existing charge on utility customers’ bills in 
hopes of generating $10.5 billion for a new wildfire fund, one that power 
companies could use to pay for fire damage—but only if they meet the 
state’s safety standards.”218  State officials “determined that electrical 
equipment owned by PG&E, including power lines and poles, was 
responsible for at least seventeen of twenty-one major fires in Northern 
California” in fall of 2017.219  PG&E already faces an estimated potential 
liability of $15 billion from the 2017 wildfires and with a liability 
insurance policy for $1.4 billion that began in August 2018, one of 
California’s biggest utilities filed for bankruptcy following the deadly 
Camp Fire, which devastated the town of Paradise in November 2018 
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and will likely generate another $15 billion in claims.220  In mid-
November 2018, PG&E’s shares dropped 20%, wiping out “[m]ore than 
half of its market value . . . as the fires have spread.”221 
Just one month earlier, in mid-October 2018, PG&E shut down 
power to 60,000 customers in Northern California to “reduce wildfire 
risks from power lines during extreme winds.”222  San Diego Gas & 
Electric Company (SDG&E), which is the primary electric provider for 
Southern California, also has a power shutoff program to deal with 
conditions the National Weather Service reports such as “red flag fire 
warnings, humidity levels, sustained winds, temperature, dry fuel and 
local terrain.”223  Shutting off power when communities face extreme fire 
danger conditions may be the only way these utilities can provide public 
safety during extreme winds.224  However, shutting off power to 
customers also avoids potential liability for damages resulting from what 
may be the utility’s negligence or possible state law violations.225  While 
the safety of people and property from wildfires is paramount, shutting 
off power to thousands of people may also cause personal injuries and 
economic damages that could potentially exceed the liability from 
wildfires and redirect the costs from the utility companies to individuals 
and businesses. 
Nevertheless, failing to shut down power in the face of high winds in 
high-risk fire areas will subject these utilities to lawsuits when their 
electrical equipment causes wildfires.  In Southern California, plaintiffs 
are claiming damages against Edison for the Woolsey Fire, which began 
in Simi Valley, California on November 8, 2018 and burned 
approximately 98,000 acres to the Malibu coastline.226  The blaze was 
100% contained on November 21 after killing three people, “destroying 
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1,643 structures, and damag[ing] 364 others.”227  The claims alleged 
include negligence, inverse condemnation, nuisance, trespass, and 
violations of the Public Utilities Code.228  According to the lawsuit, 
Edison is responsible for the Woolsey Fire, which allegedly started under 
the same conditions as the 2017 Thomas Fire.229  Edison has since 
“admitted that its equipment was associated with one of the Thomas 
Fire’s ignition points.”230  The suit alleges: 
[T]he Woolsey Fire was caused by [Edison]’s negligence in (a) failing 
to maintain its overhead electrical facilities in a safe manner; (b) failing 
to perform vegetation management in accordance with applicable 
regulations and/or (c) failing to shut down the Big Rock 16kV circuit to 
prevent a catastrophic wildfire during the Red Flag weather conditions 
that preceded the Woolsey Fire.231 
Litigation over wildfires continues to plague California.  California 
courts have denied multiple petitions for review where PG&E and 
Edison have argued against imposing inverse condemnation on privately 
owned utilities when the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) 
declines the utilities’ requests to spread liability across ratepayers.232  A 
California appellate court denied review of SDG&E’s challenge to the 
CPUC’s denial of SDG&E’s application to include $379 million in 
ratepayer fees from litigation settlements involving the Witch, Guejito, 
and Rice Fires in San Diego in 2007.233  The CPUC determined that the 
fires caused by SDG&E’s equipment were the result of SDG&E’s failure 
to operate as a reasonable and prudent manager.234  The appellate court 
issued its decision to deny the petition for review within days after the 
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deadly 2018 wildfires in early November.235  “The Commission’s 
determination that the princip[les] of inverse condemnation did not bar 
its prudent manager analysis under [Public Utilities Code] section 451 
was not in excess of its powers, nor a violation of the law, including the 
Constitutions of the United States and California.”236  The California 
Supreme Court followed suit and denied review on January 30, 2019.237 
The petitioners in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission of the State of California then sought review from the U.S. 
Supreme Court.238  SDG&E alleged that California took property from 
the private utilities without compensation by imposing strict liability 
under its inverse condemnation laws without allowing the utilities to 
recoup these damages from the ratepayers who have benefitted.239  In 
what some are calling “a taking within a taking,” the question presented 
was: “Whether it is an uncompensated taking for public use in violation 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments for a State to impose strict 
liability for inverse condemnation on a privately owned utility without 
ensuring that the cost of that liability is spread to the benefitted 
ratepayers.”240  Petitioners contended that while the government or a 
public utility may pass the costs of inverse condemnation liability on to 
the ratepayers, a privately owned utility may not raise its rates, unless the 
CPUC approves.241  Instead, the CPUC held SDG&E to a “‘prudent 
manager’ standard that does not apply when the government seeks to 
spread liability for such costs.”242 
Given that the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition in October 
2019, it is unclear when and how this ongoing litigation in California 
will be resolved.  In the meantime, the California legislature and the 
California Governor have continued to find a path forward in light of the 
fact that other state utilities may follow PG&E into bankruptcy if the 
strict liability standard for inverse condemnation claims remains and 
other actions are not taken.243  Twenty-two mayors in California have 
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even suggested that customers instead of shareholders should operate 
PG&E as a publicly-owned cooperative utility.244  The municipalization 
of private utilities has been suggested before in times of electrical 
blackouts during the Enron scandal245 and water shortages during 
droughts.246 
In July 2019, California lawmakers approved legislation to “overhaul 
how the state pays for utility wildfire damage.”247  The legislation created 
a $21 billion fund to help utilities pay for wildfire damages with utility 
shareholders and ratepayers equally splitting the costs.248  While this is 
not a final solution to the issue of increasing occurrence of wildfires in 
light of climate change, it does buy some time as we focus on wildfire 
prevention as the ultimate goal.  One analyst noted, “shuffling money 
around can only go so far.”249  He explained: 
Dollars have to come from somewhere . . . .  It’s either ratepayers, 
taxpayers, shareholders, or victims.  As these wildfires might pile up, 
you’re going to reach a point of saturation very quickly, where either 
ratepayers can’t pay their bills, shareholders won’t buy the stock and on 
down the line.  There’s no substitute for doing what we can to prevent 
wildfires.  What a bill like this does is buys a little time.250 
In November 2019, the bankruptcy court handling PG&E’s case 
concluded that California’s doctrine of inverse condemnation applies to 
PG&E and the court predicted that the California Supreme Court would 
reach the same conclusion.251  The debtors in the Chapter 11 case argued 
that the principle of strict no-fault liability applied to utilities and relied 
upon by wildfire victims has only been supported by California appellate 
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decisions, which would likely not be upheld by the California Supreme 
Court.252 
The bankruptcy court extensively reviewed California law beginning 
in 1894 and concluded that inverse condemnation applies to private 
entities providing a public utility service.253  The CPUC has authority 
over rate increases and uses a reasonableness standard based on a 
“prudent manager” standard to determine whether or not a private utility 
will be able to spread costs to ratepayers.254  The debtors argued that this 
process “severely prejudices them” because they “are not guaranteed the 
ability to pass on their inverse condemnation losses by recovery from 
ratepayers.”255  However, the court noted that no evidence was submitted 
showing that the debtors were denied cost recovery when they acted 
prudently.256 
The PG&E bankruptcy court decision upheld California’s strict 
liability inverse condemnation doctrine, which allows private utilities to 
recover costs from ratepayers so long as they act prudently and without 
tort liability.  Shortly after the bankruptcy court’s decision, PG&E settled 
with wildfire victims in Northern California for $13.5 billion.257  This 
settlement included compensation for damages caused by several 
wildfires including the Butte fire in 2015, the Tubbs fire in 2017, and the 
Campfire that destroyed Paradise in 2018.258  This is PG&E’s third major 
recent settlement after agreeing to pay $1 billion to local governments 
and other public entities and $11 billion to insurance companies that had 
already paid claims for the 2017 and 2018 wildfires.259 
Fire-prone states will continue to struggle with deaths, devastation to 
property and lives, and the economic impact of increasing wildfires.  
Land use management at the local level will need to prevent and adapt to 
these continuing disasters.  UC Berkeley School of Law’s Center for 
Law, Energy & the Environment and Resources Legacy Fund prepared 
recommendations for California’s new governor, Gavin Newson, as he 
“faces the urgent challenge of simultaneously preparing for inevitable 
disaster, improving the quality of life for residents, and minimizing the 
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greenhouse gas emissions of a society of nearly 40 million people.”260 
Specific recommendations of actions that California could take 
immediately to address the wildfire concerns include: “Creating 
comprehensive, data-driven maps that identify the highest-risk wildfire 
areas to help the state target investments in emergency response 
programs and vegetation treatment; . . . [and] creating incentives for local 
governments to limit development in high-risk fire areas . . . .”261  
California’s inverse condemnation litigation has generated great interest 
because of its strict liability standard.  Other states, however, have 
experienced similar claims for wildfire damages, with differing results. 
In Colorado, an inverse condemnation claim “requires that the taking 
itself be accomplished for a public purpose.”262  In American Family 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. American National Property & Casualty Co., 
the Colorado court addressed an insurer’s right to subrogation for claims 
paid to property owners whose land was damaged when a prescribed 
burn on Denver Water’s land “ignited and spread rapidly, resulting in 
loss of life and significant property damage.”263  The court found that the 
prescribed burn protected land from fire destruction by removing 
dangerous fuels for the public benefit.264  Even though “the spreading of 
the prescribed burn to private property was the direct, natural, or 
probable result of setting the fire,” this finding only addressed whether a 
taking occurred, not whether it was for a public purpose.265  The damage 
that occurred to the private property “was not part of the prescribed 
burn’s plan” and was not intended as a public benefit.266 
Similarly, in Texas, an inverse condemnation claim requires that the 
taking itself be carried out for a public use.267  In City of Austin v. Liberty 
Mutual Insurance, property owners and their insurance companies 
brought suit against the City of Austin for personal injury and property 
damage caused by a wildfire which started when the electric utility’s 
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overhead lines “came in contact with each other during high winds” due 
to slack in the lines.268  The property owners and insurers alleged 
nuisance, trespass, and inverse condemnation.269 
The Texas Court of Appeals ruled the tort claims were not barred by 
governmental immunity because they “arise out of the City’s 
performance of proprietary functions” rather than out of governmental 
functions.270  However, the court concluded that the inverse 
condemnation claims were not valid takings claims.271  The insurers and 
homeowners did not meet the intent requirement because they failed to 
“allege facts showing that the fire was substantially certain to occur as a 
result of the City’s maintenance decision,” and the City could therefore 
not be charged with knowledge that the “decision was substantially 
certain to cause the fire.”272  Secondly, the appellees did not show that 
the City’s maintenance decision regarding the electrical wires was for a 
public use because “the fact that some property ultimately suffered harm 
as a result of the City’s power-transmission activities undertaken for the 
benefit of the public does not mean that the property was damaged in 
order to effectuate that public benefit.”273  The public use at issue was 
“power transmission” and the damage to the homeowners did not 
advance that purpose.274 
The distinction between a tort and a taking claim may be evident, 
particularly when the litigants present distinctly separate claims.  
Nevertheless, there may still be crossover issues, particularly in cases 
where tort defenses, such as the doctrine of necessity, preclude 
compensation for a takings claim.  For example, in a wildfire damages 
case in Alaska, damaged landowners presented both a tort claim and a 
state takings claim.275  The Alaska Supreme Court in Brewer v. State 
reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
State on the landowners’ takings claim, but affirmed the judgment that 
Alaska’s firefighting activities are immune from tort liability.276  The 
court held that the specific firefighting immunity provided by an Alaska 
statute does not distinguish between planning and operational activities, 
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as does the general government immunity statute in determining 
liability.277  The legislature adopted this specific statutory immunity 
following judicial decisions in which landowners successfully sued 
Alaska for tort damages based on fire suppression efforts.278 
The Brewer court allowed the takings claim to proceed, even though 
the defense of public necessity might render the taking noncompensable 
if there were an “imminent danger and an actual emergency giving rise to 
actual necessity.”279  The court agreed with the Federal Circuit decision 
in TrinCo Investment Co. v. United States (TrinCo II),280 that the doctrine 
of necessity does not automatically preclude compensation for the taking 
of private property when the government is acting within the scope of its 
general police power by conducting firefighting activities.281  Instead, the 
doctrine may only be applied to absolve the government of liability 
when, at the moment of the taking, there was an imminent danger and 
actual emergency that required the government to choose between 
damaging private property and averting an impending peril.282 
The Federal Circuit has also intermingled tort concepts with takings 
claims.  In TrinCo II, the Federal Circuit recognized the tort defense of 
necessity as a defense to a claim for just compensation resulting from a 
taking of private property.283  TrinCo II involved the destruction of 
timber from wildfire in a situation where backburning actions by the 
Forest Service may have resulted in damage to landowners’ properties, 
and there was a material fact issue of whether these actions could be 
excused based upon the necessity defense.284  On remand, the Federal 
Claims court in TrinCo III relied on a Texas case, Steele v. City of 
Houston,285 and the previously discussed Alaska case, Brewer v. State,286 
as well as the Federal Circuit’s reversal and remand of the takings claims 
in TrinCo II,287 to establish a “framework for determining when a 
necessity defense would excuse government-caused fire damage to 
private property while fighting a wildfire.”288 
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The Federal Circuit in TrinCo II and the Federal Court of Claims in 
TrinCo III offered scant support for recognizing a necessity defense to a 
takings claim.  The Supreme Court of North Dakota in Irwin v. City of 
Minot nevertheless relied on the TrinCo II decision to claim that 
“[f]ederal courts have adopted the ‘doctrine of necessity’ to absolve the 
State of compensating a party for lost or damaged property.”289  The 
Irwin court also relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council for “defin[ing] this defense from 
compensation by requiring proof of actual necessity to forestall ‘other 
grave threats to the lives and property of others.’”290  The Irwin court 
reversed the summary judgment against the City and remanded to allow 
the City to assert a necessity defense against an inverse condemnation 
action brought by landowners for damages suffered from the City’s 
removal of clay and topsoil from their property to combat a flood by 
constructing emergency earthen dikes.291 
It is not clear how the “doctrine of necessity” can preclude a takings 
claim under existing takings jurisprudence unless the so-called nuisance 
exception identified by the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council is summoned to defeat a takings claim.292  The nuisance 
exception from Lucas is based on the premise that the state relied on 
“background principles of nuisance and property law” to deny a 
landowner’s use of property, such that there is no taking because the 
landowner never had the right to use the property in a way that 
constitutes a prohibited nuisance.293 
The Court recognized this concept in Mugler v. Kansas, upholding a 
regulation during prohibition that denied a brewery’s right to continue 
operation of what was previously a lawful use.294  Similarly, in cases 
where the government has entered private property to remediate property 
that poses a safety hazard, courts have denied takings claims.295  
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However, when the government acts to address a public nuisance and, in 
doing so, damages the landowner by cutting off access to their property, 
a court has allowed a takings claim to proceed.296  In addition to using 
the nuisance exception to counter a takings claim, “[t]he public trust 
doctrine has provided a viable defense to takings claims by private 
landowners of riparian and coastal parcels.”297  This evolving doctrine is 
particularly relevant to “temporary physical occupations of parcels on 
navigable waterways and tidelands, which are situated at the geographic 
core of the public trust doctrine.”298 
There appears to be some similarity between the TrinCo line of cases 
involving wildfires discussed above and the distinction drawn by the 
Tenth Circuit in the Lech v. Jackson299 decision discussed below as to 
damagings claims from police activities.  In the TrinCo line of cases, the 
tort doctrine of necessity is applied to inverse condemnation claims to 
avoid the payment of just compensation,300 whereas in Lech, the Tenth 
Circuit distinguished between the police power and the power of eminent 
domain to avoid a takings claim.301  Both lines of cases appear to rely on 
the early case of Miller v. Schoene302 for the proposition that just 
compensation is not required when the government acts to address 
emergencies or operates within its police power.303 
Finally, federal courts have dismissed Fifth Amendment inverse 
condemnation claims for wildfire damage for failure to state a cognizable 
claim.  In Cary v. United States, landowners in San Diego living nearby 
the Cleveland National Forest (CNF) suffered damages from the Cedar 
Fire, which began in the national forest in 2003 when a lost hunter set a 
signal fire to aid rescuers in their search for him.304  Relying on an 
analogy between the fire and the flooding cases in the Federal Circuit,305 
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the landowners alleged that the Cedar Fire was “the direct, natural, and 
probable result” of the two U.S. Forest Service policies—suppressing all 
forest fires in the CNF and allowing human visitors in the forest.306  The 
landowners compared the Forest Service fire suppression policy, which 
“disrupts the natural consumption of fuel for the public good,” to 
building a dam, which “disrupt[s] the natural flow of water for the public 
good.”307  Nevertheless, the court noted, “[t]he key difference between 
the flood cases and the instant controversy is that the policy of 
suppressing fires did not set the Cedar Fire in motion as the dams did the 
floods.”308 
The Cary court contrasted fire cases with flood cases.  The court 
explained that in the Ridge Line flooding case, the government “acquired 
a flowage easement from the runoff created by its alteration of the area’s 
storm drainage.”309  In the Cedar Fire case, however, the government did 
not acquire any easement or other property through the fire.310  The court 
countered the landowners’ contention that the taking by fire was 
permanent, unlike floodings that recede, by stating: 
[M]any a city has rebuilt after a devastating fire, so we cannot infer 
from the complaint that the fire prevented the rebuilding of 
infrastructure that would allow the landowners to reoccupy their 
property.  Furthermore, floods and fires can both substantially injure 
real and personal property with merely one invasion.  In the flooding 
cases, appropriation means that the water stays on the property 
indefinitely, or predictably returns—a permanent invasion.  Here, the 
fire has come and gone, and there is no allegation that the injuries 
prevent future use of the land, or that the fire will intermittently but 
inevitably recur.311 
3. Examples of Damagings Claims for Other Unfortunate Events 
The major focus of this Article is to address paying for the disasters 
from flooding and fires due to human decisions and infrastructure that 
convert a natural event into a natural disaster.312  However, individuals 
encountering damages to their property caused by government action or 
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inaction in situations other than flood or fire may also experience what 
they would consider a personal disaster. 
This subsection looks at how courts have addressed other types of 
damages caused by government or private entities acting for the general 
public benefit but disproportionately burdening certain members of the 
public.  These decisions may be helpful for assessing future inverse 
condemnation claims and the potential defenses.  For example, in the 
water supply claims discussed below, should there be a different 
outcome when the actions of public water districts result in “uninvited” 
water flooding landowners versus “consensual” delivery of water into 
private plumbing systems?  Or, should an inverse condemnation claim be 
viable for the Flint River situation in Michigan, where the state actors 
“knew or should have known” of the dangers of the new water source, 
but not when the Moulton Niguel water district in California added 
approved chemicals to the water supply that damaged plaintiffs’ copper 
pipes?  Are courts continuing to rely on concepts of fault found in tort 
law even when deciding inverse condemnation claims that generally do 
not require a showing of negligence? 
a. Water Supply 
In Flint, Michigan, the City was under emergency management by 
officers or employees of the state.313  State actors changed the water 
source for plaintiff residents to the contaminated Flint River and rejected 
the City’s request to return to the Detroit water system once residents 
realized the new water source was contaminated.314  As a result of the 
state’s decision “to send water they knew or had reason to know was 
unsafe through the pipelines and into plaintiffs’ homes and businesses,” 
the plaintiffs “sustained property damage, including irreparably damaged 
service line pipes, loss of use and enjoyment of their property, and 
substantial loss in the value of their properties.”315  The court found this 
affirmative action to change the water source was a deliberate 
government action that justified the plaintiffs’ claim of inverse 
condemnation.316 
Compare the Flint River water case to the California appellate 
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decision in Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water District, which denied 
plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim against the water district for 
adding chloramines to drinking water for safety purposes because the 
action did not violate any regulations.317  In Moulton Niguel, 
homeowners alleged that defendant water districts damaged the copper 
piping in their homes by adding the chemical chloramine to the tap 
water.318  The plaintiffs asserted causes of action for public and private 
nuisance and for inverse condemnation.319  The court held that the water 
districts were immune from the nuisance claims320 and that California’s 
damaging phrase, added to the Constitution in 1879, did not expand 
eminent domain to cover the voluntary acceptance of water into the 
plaintiffs’ plumbing systems.321  The court distinguished this situation 
where the water districts complied with regulations from an earlier 
decision in Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego, which upheld an inverse 
condemnation claim for compensation in a situation where a corroded 
fire hydrant allowed “uninvited water onto the plaintiff’s property.”322  
The court found that California’s constitutional provision for a taking or 
damaging of private property for public use “has never been applied to 
require a public entity to compensate a property owner for alleged 
property damage” resulting from actions that are “fully compliant” with 
state and federal regulations.323 
The Moulton Niguel court recognized the “historically settled 
application of the Just Compensation Clause . . . that government must 
pay for property it seizes through an exercise of eminent domain.”324  Yet 
it found that the California constitutional provision for takings and 
damagings has never “been extended to apply outside the realm of 
eminent domain or public works.”325  The court compared the 
homeowners’ theory of liability to a “traditional product liability 
theory.”326  A product liability theory is essentially a strict liability theory 
to spread the costs for damaged consumers.  California courts have 
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recognized strict liability for inverse condemnation claims.327  The 
Moulton Niguel court also distinguished previous cases finding inverse 
condemnation for water damage because those cases involved uninvited 
water from flooding, whereas here the plaintiffs “voluntarily purchased 
the water from the [w]ater [d]istricts and brought the water into their 
private piping system.”328 
Residents in Chicago, Illinois experienced problems with their water 
supply similar to the situations in Flint, Michigan, and Moulton Niguel, 
California, when the City of Chicago replaced/repaired its lead pipe 
water mains and water meters, allegedly causing the release of high 
levels of lead into the water supply and damaging properties.329  
Plaintiffs asserted claims of negligence and inverse condemnation.330  
The court first found that the plaintiffs’ negligence claim should not be 
dismissed because they “ha[d] sufficiently alleged facts to support their 
claims of injury and damages due to the City’s negligence” and the City 
had not established the affirmative defense of tort immunity.331  Second, 
the court held that the plaintiffs’ claim of inverse condemnation should 
not be dismissed because it “sufficiently allege[d] they ha[d] incurred 
excess damages beyond that experienced by the public generally” and 
they did not benefit from the water main replacement because the 
replacement “made their water more dangerous than that consumed by 
the general public.”332  Relying on the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision 
in Hampton v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the court noted 
“‘the Illinois takings clause reaches beyond the scope of the federal 
takings clause’ to provide a remedy when government action damages 
private property.”333 
The California court in Moulton Niguel refused to find inverse 
condemnation liability for government actions taken to replace or repair 
the water or water supply system provided to residents who “voluntarily” 
accepted water from the water district.334  In contrast, the courts in Flint 
and Chicago held that even though the water districts were operating 
within “acceptable” regulatory authority, the government actions 
 
 327. See discussion supra Section II.A.1.b. 
 328. Moulton Niguel, 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 366. 
 329. See Berry v. City of Chicago, 133 N.E.3d 1201 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). 
 330. Id. at 1204. 
 331. Id. at 1211. 
 332. Id. at 1216–17. 
 333. Id. at 1215 (quoting Hampton v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., 57 N.E.3d 1229, 1240 
(Ill. 2016)). 
 334. Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist., 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 356, 366 (2018). 
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overburdened some of the residents with property damages for the 
public’s benefit.  This unfair burdening of some to achieve a public 
benefit was sufficient to allege a cause of action for inverse 
condemnation—a concept appropriately applied to prevent some people 
alone from bearing public burdens, which should be “borne by the public 
as a whole.”335 
b. Public Works 
The intrusion of sewer water from the public sewer system into 
private residences or businesses has generated continuing litigation 
across the country, particularly as our infrastructure ages.  Several states 
have held public works liable when a sewer system fails and causes 
damage to private property, even in situations where there was no direct 
government action, but instead the government failed to maintain the 
system. 
Missouri courts appear to rely on concepts of negligence and 
nuisance to find liability under inverse condemnation law.  In Christ v. 
Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, homeowners asserted an inverse 
condemnation claim against Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District 
(MSD) for damages they suffered when a blocked main resulted in the 
backup of contaminated water into their home.336  The court explained 
Missouri “inverse condemnation is the exclusive remedy when private 
property is damaged by a nuisance operated by an entity having the 
power of eminent domain.”337  Here, MSD responded after receiving 
notice of the problem from the plaintiffs and removed the debris causing 
the blockage, which MSD attributed to storm rainfall and the age of the 
sewer.338  The plaintiffs argued that MSD was liable for failing to 
maintain and inspect the sewer system, but the court found that “MSD 
did not commit any affirmative act upon which liability could be 
based . . . [and] MSD cannot be held liable for inverse condemnation for 
issues based upon an alleged failure to prospectively maintain or inspect 
the sewers.”339  The court discussed whether the sewer district had a duty 
to correct a blocked sewer, which indicates its reliance on a negligence 
standard.340  In addition, the court concluded that an inverse 
 
 335. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 336. 287 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 337. Id. (quoting Basham v. City of Cuba, 257 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)). 
 338. Id. at 712. 
 339. Id. at 713. 
 340. Id. at 712. 
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condemnation action in Missouri requires a nuisance that damages 
private property.341 
A subsequent Missouri decision, Miller v. City of Wentzville, 
determined that affirmative action by the City of Wentzville is not 
required so long as it has notice of a problem and fails to correct or 
discontinue an unreasonable use that constitutes a nuisance.342  In Miller, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the public street maintained by the City moved 
and expanded over the years because of the lack of adequate expansion 
joints.343  This “street creep” pushed against the plaintiffs’ driveway 
causing damage to the garage and foundation of their home.344  The court 
determined that once the City had notice of the problem, the plaintiffs 
were not required to prove that affirmative actions of the government 
caused the injury.345  While the Miller court permitted inaction as the 
basis for an inverse condemnation claim and the Christ court required 
affirmative action, nuisance was still required for liability in both of 
these Missouri decisions.346 
The Miller court outlined the elements necessary to support an 
inverse condemnation action based on nuisance, and as in the Christ 
case, the Miller court used the concept of duty to determine whether the 
City’s lack of action after receiving notice of the problem supported 
liability under an inverse condemnation claim.347  This reliance on duty 
and a failure to act indicates an analysis based on negligence, but 
Missouri courts frame liability based on the unreasonableness of a city’s 
inaction.348 
Other courts have refused to recognize inverse condemnation claims 
where the government has taken direct action that ultimately damages 
individual landowners but the government was not aware of the damages 
its actions would cause.  For example, in Dunn v. City of Milwaukie, the 
Oregon Supreme Court held that the City of Milwaukie’s actions in using 
“highly pressurized water to clean the sewer lines adjacent to plaintiff’s 
house, causing sewage to back up through toilets and bathroom fixtures,” 
 
 341. Id. at 713. 
 342. 371 S.W.3d 54, 61–62 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 343. Id. at 55–56. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 61. 
 346. See id. at 57; Christ, 287 S.W.3d at 713.   
 347. Miller, 371 S.W.3d at 57, 60–61. 
 348. See id. at 61 (“[I]t is the failure to correct or discontinue an unreasonable use after notice 
that gives rise to a nuisance. . . .  The issue then was whether the use was unreasonable, and if so, 
whether defendant failed to correct or discontinue the unreasonable use.”). 
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did not constitute a taking requiring compensation.349  The court 
explained, “[W]here compensation is sought for injuries caused by 
physical invasions or occupations of property, the intent element of a 
takings claim is fundamental in distinguishing between those actions that 
are the equivalent of an exercise of eminent domain and those that are 
actionable as ordinary torts.”350  The court found that because “backups 
of sewage into adjacent houses due to the [C]ity’s hydrocleaning are rare 
and uncommon occurrences,” the evidence was insufficient to support 
the inverse condemnation claim.351  The evidence did not establish “that 
the sewage backup into plaintiff’s house was the necessary, certain, 
predictable, or inevitable result of the [C]ity’s intentional manner of 
hydrocleaning the adjacent sewer” because these occurrences were 
rare.352 
Nebraska takes yet another view as to when property owners are 
entitled to assert an inverse condemnation claim.  It requires that 
property owners’ damages “must be the result of the governmental 
entity’s exercise of its right of eminent domain.”353  In Henderson v. City 
of Columbus, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that Nebraska’s 
constitutional provision for just compensation “is not a source of 
compensation for every action or inaction by a governmental entity that 
causes damage to property.  Instead, it provides compensation only for 
the taking or damaging of property that occurs as the result of an entity’s 
exercise of its right of eminent domain.”354  A Nebraska appellate court 
in Essink v. City of Gretna relied on the Henderson decision to find that 
sewage backups into the plaintiffs’ residences from the City of Gretna’s 
sewage collection system were not compensable.355 
Most recently, the California Supreme Court in City of Oroville v. 
Superior Court concluded that the City of Oroville was not liable in 
inverse condemnation for the City’s sewer system failure that allowed 
sewage to back up into a dentist’s office building, spewing raw sewage 
 
 349. 328 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Or. 2014). 
 350. Id. at 1270. 
 351. Id. at 1274. 
 352. Id. at 1274–75 (holding plaintiff’s negligence action would not be subject to sovereign 
immunity, but claim was dismissed “for lack of timely notice”). 
 353. Henderson v. City of Columbus, 827 N.W.2d 486, 493 (Neb. 2013). 
 354. Id. at 494 (applying reasoning from Chavez v. City of Laramie, 389 P.2d 23, 25 (Wyo. 
1964)). 
 355. 901 N.W.2d 466, 475–76 (Neb. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that evidence showed sewer 
backups were not frequent or recurring and City did not know and could not have foreseen that 
damage would occur from authorized governmental action). 
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from the toilets, sinks, and drains.356  The court reversed the trial and 
appellate court decisions finding the City “liable in inverse 
condemnation where sewage backs up onto private property because of a 
blockage in the City’s sewer main.”357  Instead, the court required the 
plaintiffs to show that the injury to property arose from the “inherent 
dangers of the public improvement as deliberately designed, constructed, 
or maintained.”358  This requirement avoids a finding of liability in all 
inverse condemnation cases based solely on the existence of a causal 
connection between the private property damage and a public 
improvement.359 
The California court distinguished the flooding claims addressed in 
Belair and noted that “Belair did not announce a rule triggering liability 
in all inverse condemnation cases based solely on the existence of any 
conceivable causal connection between a public improvement and 
private property damage.”360  Instead, the court concluded that “inverse 
condemnation liability depends on whether the property damage was the 
probable result or necessary effect of an inherent risk associated with the 
design, construction, or maintenance of the relevant public 
improvement.”361  Here, the property owners did not sufficiently 
establish that the damage was substantially caused by the sewage system 
since the owners failed to install a backwater valve that “would have 
prevented or substantially diminished the risk of the mishap” that 
occurred in this case.362 
Then, a tree falls on your house.  In Mercury Casualty Co. v. City of 
Pasadena, a tree owned by the City of Pasadena fell onto the 
homeowners’ house in hurricane-level winds in 2011.363  The 
homeowners’ insurer sued the City in inverse condemnation, and the trial 
court found that the tree that fell on the home was a work of public 
improvement supporting an inverse condemnation claim.364  The 
appellate court reversed, finding that the City was not inversely liable for 
the damage to the home by the tree because there was no evidence that 
the City planted it as part of a project to serve a public purpose and the 
 
 356. 446 P.3d 304, 307 (Cal. 2019). 
 357. Id. at 309, 316. 
 358. Id. at 312. 
 359. Id. at 315. 
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 361. Id. at 316. 
 362. Id. 
 363. 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 410 (Ct. App. 2017). 
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City’s tree maintenance plan was not deficient.365  The court noted that 
“[o]nly three published decisions have addressed inverse condemnation 
claims arising out of a public entity’s ownership of trees, none of which 
held the entity inversely liable.”366  However, the court pointed out that 
its holding “does not immunize the City from all forms of liability for 
damage caused by its trees,” because a public entity may be liable for a 
dangerous condition on public property that damages adjacent private 
property.367 
The success of inverse condemnation or damagings claims for public 
work failures is limited.  Courts do not generally hold local governments 
liable for damages to private property owners caused by falling trees or 
damages caused by public infrastructure failures.  Instead, cities are 
typically only held liable for landowner damages when the city was 
aware that its actions could foreseeably cause damage or where it knew 
that its failure to act would result in property damage. 
c. Other Damagings Claims 
Landowners have asserted damagings claims to recover for property 
damages when law enforcement pursues criminal suspects.368  For 
example, in Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co.,369 an armed 
suspect pursued by the Minneapolis police entered Wegner’s home and 
hid in the front closet.370  The SWAT team responded and the tear gas 
and flash-bang grenades used to apprehend the suspect caused extensive 
damage to Wegner’s house.371  Wegner and her insurance company 
requested just compensation from the City of Milwaukee for the property 
damage, but the lower courts held that even though there was a “taking” 
under the Minnesota constitution, the “taking” did not require just 
compensation because it was a public necessity.372  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that where police damage an innocent third party’s 
 
 365. Id. at 419. 
 366. Id. at 415. 
 367. Id. at 420; see also Rupert v. City of Rapid City, 827 N.W.2d 55, 63 (S.D. 2013) (finding 
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 369. 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991). 
 370. Id. at 39. 
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property while apprehending a suspect, the government is not 
constitutionally liable for a taking.373  The court relied on Steele v. City of 
Houston,374 where fire destroyed plaintiffs’ house as the police 
apprehended a group of prisoners who had taken refuge in the house.375  
The Texas Supreme Court in Steele remanded the case to the trial court 
to allow the plaintiffs to prove “that the City of Houston, acting through 
its officers with authority or color of authority, intentionally set the house 
on fire . . . [and] that the destruction” was for a public use.376 
Both Washington and California courts have found liability for 
damagings from wildfires, so it is somewhat surprising that these states 
have refused to find a taking or damaging where law enforcement 
activities damage private property.377  In Customer Co. v. City of 
Sacramento, police fired tear gas into a retail store to apprehend a 
suspect who had taken refuge in the store, which caused extensive 
damage to the storeowner’s property.378  The California Supreme Court 
refused to recognize the storeowner’s claim for inverse condemnation.379  
It noted that the California constitutional provision for paying just 
compensation for a taking or damaging of private property had 
“never . . . been applied to require a public entity to compensate a 
property owner for property damage resulting from the efforts of law 
enforcement officers to enforce the criminal laws.”380 
In Eggleston v. Pierce County, the Washington Supreme Court held 
that the homeowner did not suffer a cognizable takings when her “home 
was rendered uninhabitable by the execution of a criminal search warrant 
and preservation order.”381  The court recognized that the Washington 
takings clause provides greater protection than its Fifth Amendment 
counterpart, but held that the seizure and preservation of evidence was 
not a taking under the state constitution.382  In addressing the “harder 
question” of “whether the destruction of property by police activity other 
than collecting evidence pursuant to a warrant could ever be a 
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compensable taking,” the court refused to extend takings to address 
situations where law enforcement acts unlawfully because “there are 
other, more suitable, remedies available.”383 
The Tenth Circuit in Lech v. Jackson distinguished between 
government actions taken under the eminent domain power and those 
actions taken under the police power to find that law enforcement actions 
do not constitute takings because they are within the scope of the police 
power.384  The Lechs’ home was the site of a nineteen-hour standoff 
between a burglar in their home and the City of Greenwood Village’s 
tactical police team.385  As a result of the standoff, the home was 
uninhabitable, but the City denied liability for the damages.386  The 
Lechs sued alleging a violation of both the federal and the Colorado 
Takings Clause based on the defendants’ failure to provide just 
compensation for the damaging of their home.387 
The district court’s decision, as upheld by the Tenth Circuit, 
concluded that “the tactical decisions that ultimately destroyed [the 
Lechs’] home were made pursuant to the state’s police powers and not 
the power of eminent domain.”388  While the Tenth Circuit agreed the 
defendants’ actions benefited the public, it cited Mugler v. Kansas,389 
Miller v. Schoene,390 and several other federal circuit decisions 
distinguishing the police power (which requires no compensation) from 
the power of eminent domain.391 
Private owners of taxi medallions have also asserted inverse 
condemnation claims when local government allows ride sharing apps 
such as Uber, Lyft, or Gett that devalue the medallions’ worth.392  Most, 
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if not all, of these claims have been unsuccessful.  In Newark Cab Ass’n 
v. City of Newark, taxicab and limousine owners and operators sued the 
City of Newark for entering into agreements with Uber and other 
Transportation Network Companies (TNCs).393  The plaintiffs alleged 
that the City violated their rights under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment by subjecting the TNCs to less restrictive regulations than 
imposed on taxicabs and limousines, thus reducing the value of their 
property interest in the medallions based on the “inherent value of the 
exclusivity of the taxi medallion.”394 
In dismissing the takings claim, the court first noted that the 
plaintiffs retained possession of their medallions, and the City thus did 
not physically take them.395  Second, in response to the plaintiffs’ 
allegation that the market value of a taxi medallion fell significantly after 
Uber began operating in the City, the court held that “the decrease in the 
market value of the taxi medallions is not sufficient to constitute a 
cognizable property interest necessary to state a claim under the Takings 
Clause.”396 
At the time of this publication, there appears to be no authority for 
treating the devaluing of a taxicab medallion as either a federal or state 
inverse condemnation or damagings claim.397  As the Third Circuit noted 
in Newark Cab, “the plaintiffs have provided no authority in support of 
their position that their taxi medallions include a right to be the exclusive 
providers of transportation services in Newark, or that this right 
constitutes a separate cognizable property interest that can be the subject 
of a Takings Clause claim.”398  The Eleventh Circuit in Checker Cab 
Operators, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County similarly held that the medallions 
granted by the 1998 Miami-Dade County Ordinance “conveyed only a 
property interest in providing taxicab services in Miami-Dade County—
not in barring competitors.”399  As did the Third Circuit, the Eleventh 
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Circuit noted that no precedent supported the theory of exclusivity put 
forth by the medallion holders, and that “[w]hat caselaw we can find 
overwhelmingly holds that taxicab medallion holders do not have a 
property right to bar competitors from entering the market.”400 
B. Just Compensation as the Payment for Government Damagings 
1. Is Just Compensation Just? 
The question of “just compensation” continues to be a contentious 
concept at both the federal and the state level.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States confirmed that the proper 
measurement of compensation under the Fifth Amendment is market 
price, even if the property value includes attributes that are not 
transferable.401  In those situations “where there is no relevant market for 
the property,” courts will generally determine the fair market value “by 
any method of valuation that is just and equitable.”402  Where the 
government condemns private property to assemble land for private 
development, however, fair market value may not be the right standard if 
“market value has been too difficult to find, or when its application 
would result in manifest injustice to owner or public.”403 
In the land assembly process, market value may not be difficult to 
find, but applying the general rule (just compensation “is measured by 
the property owner’s loss rather than the government’s gain”) to the 
private owner would be unjust.404  Manifest injustice results when the 
rule precludes the condemnee from sharing any premium realized by a 
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private entity that has benefited directly from the government 
acquisition.  The property owner is not entitled to any “nonpecuniary 
losses attributable to ‘his unique need for property or idiosyncratic 
attachment to it.”‘405  “Without a change in these general rules, just 
compensation may not always be just.”406 
Many scholars and practitioners have underscored the lack of 
fairness in the just compensation calculation.407  However, there has been 
limited empirical support for the case against unjust compensation.408  
Some of the concerns about just compensation include the failure to 
account for values such as sentimental attachment to the property, 
moving expenses, the loss of an existing community,409 and assimilation 
into a new community.410  In addition, there has been a trend in local and 
state governments to “sandbag” property owners by obtaining an 
appraisal of property value and making a pre-condemnation offer based 
on this appraisal.411  If negotiations fail and the government brings an 
eminent domain proceeding, the government “uses a second, lower 
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 409. See generally Shai Stern, Takings, Community, and Value: Reforming Takings Law to 
Fairly Compensate Common Interest Communities, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 141 (2014). 
 410. See Fennell, supra note 407, at 111–12. 
 411. C. Jarrett Dieterle, The Sandbagging Phenomenon: How Governments Lower Eminent 
Domain Appraisals to Punish Landowners, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 38, 38 (2016). 
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appraisal as its evidence of the land’s value” at trial.412 
2. Compensation for Business Damages 
One of the areas of concern is the compensation paid to “going 
businesses.”  In a federal condemnation action, the measure of just 
compensation is the taker’s gain, not the owner’s loss, and does not allow 
for the recovery of business damages.413  There are some exceptions 
allowing for business damages when there is legislation or congressional 
allowances for lost business damages or when the government intends to 
take the business itself, such as taking public utilities for purposes of 
continuing the business.414  While the practice “of denying compensation 
to business owners whose business interests were damaged or destroyed 
by a condemnation of the underlying land” has been highly criticized, 
states have made some progress in recognizing these losses as part of just 
compensation.415  Compensating for business losses in state 
condemnation actions is a question of state law, yet a majority of states 
still exclude business losses from just compensation recovery.416  Even in 
jurisdictions that allow the recovery of business losses, the damages 
permitted vary and may be limited in scope and nature.417 
In a disaster recovery case, the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in 
South Lafourche Levee District v. Jarreau illustrates how states control 
the determination of whether or not business damages and attorneys’ fees 
will be part of a just compensation award.418  Louisiana amended its 
constitution and statutes governing compensation for appropriations used 
 
 412. Id.  
 413. Darius W. Dynkowski, Preparing a Business Damage Claim, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING 
LEGAL EDUC., Jan. 8–10, 2009, at 251, 254 (citing United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943)). 
 414. Id. at 254–55. 
 415. Lynda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the Just 
Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REV. 283, 283 (1991).  See, e.g., L.A. Cty. Metro. Transp. Auth. 
v. Yum Yum Donut Shops, Inc., 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201 (Ct. App. 2019) (holding that under 
California’s good will statute, the donut shop must prove that it deserves damages for loss of 
goodwill resulting from condemnation and the jury must determine how much it may recover). 
 416. John C. Murphy et al., What’s Wrong with the Law of Valuation in Eminent Domain? Four 
Rules We Need to Change, A.L.I. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., Feb. 5–7, 2015, at 515, 518 (“Eleven 
states allow for some type of recovery for business losses.  But thirty-nine do not.”). 
 417. See Dynkowski, supra note 413, at 253.  See, e.g., Thee Aguila, Inc. v. Century Law Grp., 
LLP, 249 Cal. Rptr. 3d 254, 256–58 (Ct. App. 2019) (finding the state legislatively provided 
compensation for damages such as “goodwill” of a business operated on condemned property 
separate from compensation paid for the property, but the lease provision did not distinguish the 
lessee’s leasehold value from goodwill of the business and was not expansive enough to preclude the 
court from allowing goodwill to exist apart from leasehold). 
 418. 217 So. 3d 298, 301 (La. 2017). 
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in hurricane protection projects following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.419  
The court examined these amendments and concluded that they reduced, 
but did not eliminate, damages paid to property owners for takings or 
damages to property for hurricane protection projects.420  Based on the 
court’s interpretation of the amendments, the landowner was entitled to 
compensation for the taking or damage to his property “limited to that 
required by the Fifth Amendment, which is the fair market value of the 
property at the time of the appropriation, which does not include loss 
profits and other severance damages.”421  Relying on the state 
constitution and legislation, the court upheld the denial of Jarreau’s 
request for compensation for his excavating business and limited his 
attorneys’ fees to “twenty-five percent of the difference between the 
award and the amount found to be due by the state, the levee board, or 
the federal government.”422 
3. Attorneys’ Fees Reimbursement 
Similar to business damages discussed above, attorney’s fees are not 
required under federal constitutional demands for just compensation.  
However, federal legislation, state legislation, or a state constitutional 
takings provision may require compensation for reasonable attorney’s 
fees.423  Section 304(c) of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real 
Property Acquisition Act (“Uniform Relocation Act”) waives “federal 
sovereign immunity as to attorneys’ fees and expenses in takings 
cases.”424  The Uniform Relocation Act allows the court to reimburse a 
plaintiff “for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, 
including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually 
incurred because of such proceeding.”425 
Yet even when federal legislation requires that landowners receive 
“reasonable attorney, appraisal and engineering fees, and other related 
costs,” a state may refuse to pay these costs in a state inverse 
condemnation claim on a federally assisted project based on state 
 
 419. Id.  
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. at 311. 
 422. Id. at 313–14 (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 38:301(C)(2)(f) (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. 
Sess.)) (noting the Louisana statutory provision at issue “is tailored specifically to matters involving 
the taking, use, damage, or destruction of property for levee purposes pursuant to [the statute]”). 
 423. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain §§ 557, 622 (2017 & Supp. 2019). 
 424. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 92, 95 (2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 
4654(c) (2012)). 
 425. Id. (quoting § 4654(c)).  
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statute.426  In Long v. South Dakota, the landowners prevailed on their 
claim for flooding damages caused by highway construction that failed to 
provide adequate culverts.427  However, the South Dakota Supreme Court 
agreed with the state that the state statute did not expressly authorize 
attorney fees, but only stated that the state “may provide relocation 
benefits and assistance . . . in connection with federally assisted projects 
to the same extent and for the same purposes as provided for” in the 
Uniform Relocation Act.428 
When the state expressly allows reasonable attorney’s fees, courts 
may be reluctant to award such fees.  For example, in TransCanada 
Keystone Pipeline, LP v. Nicholas Family Ltd. Partnership, landowners 
challenged the proposed pipeline route and succeeded in getting the 
pipeline company to stay its condemnation petitions during the litigation 
challenging the constitutionality of such proceedings.429  Nebraska law 
allows for reasonable attorney’s fees in a condemnation proceeding,430 
but in this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court denied the landowners 
motions for attorney’s fees and costs due to a lack of specificity in the 
landowners’ affidavits as to the individual landowner and the work 
performed.431 
4. Who Decides What Remedy Is Just? 
In addition to the issues of whether business damages and attorney’s 
fees will be included as part of just compensation claims, there is still 
debate over who it is that decides what remedy is just––the Federal Court 
of Claims or an Article III court with the corresponding Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury.  Professor William Stoebuck’s historical 
exploration of eminent domain noted that, “compensation was the regular 
 
 426. See Long v. State, 904 N.W.2d 358, 360 (S.D. 2017) (upholding landowners’ inverse 
condemnation claim against the state and the city for damages due to flooding caused by highway 
construction and inadequate culverts, but denying payment by the state for fees requested). 
 427. Id. 
 428. Id. at 363 (alteration in original) (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 5-2-18 (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 Sess.); see also Rupert v. City of Rapid City, 827 N.W.2d 55, 67 (S.D. 2013) (finding 
landowners were not entitled to recover attorney fees under the South Dakota statute because the 
statute did not expressly apply to inverse condemnation cases). 
 429. 908 N.W.2d 60 (Neb. 2018). 
 430. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-726 (2009 & Supp. 2013); see also MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29 (“In 
the event of litigation, just compensation shall include necessary expenses of litigation to be awarded 
by the court when the private property owner prevails.”); SDS, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 
978 So.2d 1013, 1018 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (holding a state statute provides for award of attorneys’ 
fees and costs in an inverse condemnation action). 
 431. TransCanada Keystone, 908 N.W.2d at 68. 
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practice in England and America, as far as we can tell, during the whole 
colonial period” and that “[a]n owner aggrieved by the ‘jury’s’ estimate 
could appeal to the county court.”432 
Who decides whether just compensation is “just” arose in Brott v. 
United States,433 when Michigan landowners filed suit in federal district 
court seeking just compensation for the taking of their properties for 
recreational trails.434  The landowners asserted that, “to the extent that the 
Tucker Act and the Little Tucker Act establish that the Court of Federal 
Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over the landowners’ just-
compensation claims, those Acts are unconstitutional because they 
deprive the landowners of review in an Article III Court and by a 
jury.”435  The Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court decision and 
agreed “that the Court of Federal Claims is the exclusive forum for the 
landowners’ compensation claims and that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction.”436  The appellate court found that the Fifth Amendment 
provides for a right to compensation, but not the means to enforce that 
right.437  It explained that Congress established the Court of Claims 
(modernly the Court of Federal Claims) as an Article I tribunal in 1855, 
and in 1887, the Tucker Act expanded the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction 
and waived sovereign immunity to allow for just compensation claims 
against the United States.438 
The landowners in Brott contended that their rights under the Fifth 
Amendment for just compensation were “private” rights that were not 
assignable to a legislative court or an administrative agency.439  
However, the Sixth Circuit held that the landowners’ claims were 
“‘public right’ claims that Congress may assign to a non-Article III court 
for review.”440  The landowners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
presenting the question: “Can the federal government take private 
property and deny the owner the ability to vindicate his constitutional 
right to be justly compensated in an Article III Court with trial by 
jury?”441  The Court denied the petition for certiorari without comment, 
 
 432. Stoebuck, supra note 34, at 583. 
 433. 858 F.3d 425 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1324 (2018). 
 434. Id. at 427. 
 435. Id. at 428. 
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thus, the question remains and future litigation may eventually sort out 
the final answer as to who decides what constitutes just compensation.442 
III. TORT LIABILITY AND INSURANCE 
When government action (and possibly inaction) causes property 
damage, tort claims will likely be unsuccessful, as sovereign immunity 
typically shields the government from liability.443  State and federal 
governments may waive immunity in some situations to allow plaintiffs 
to bring tort claims, but these waivers are limited.444  The federal 
government relies on the Federal Tort Claims Act for immunity for 
discretionary actions when a federal employee exercises or fails to 
exercise a “discretionary function or duty . . . whether or not the 
discretion involved be abused.”445  The federal government, in turn, “has 
not only sought to hold individuals and entities liable for the costs of 
suppressing fires caused by third parties and by seeking astronomical 
awards, but has also sought to impose criminal liability against those 
fighting the fires.”446  State legislation may also shield state and local 
governments from tort liability.447  As discussed above, “those states with 
‘damaging’ clauses attached to their ‘takings clauses’ allow for greater 
government liability outside the context of strict tort theory.”448 
The line between tort law and takings law is unclear when courts 
hold that government actions severely impacting the use and enjoyment 
of land constitute takings yet they invoke a nuisance standard suggesting 
 
jurisdiction to adjudicate an owner’s constitutional right to be justly compensated” and “Congress 
cannot deny by statute the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a right to trial by jury”). 
 442. See Brott, 138 S. Ct. at 1325. 
 443. See, e.g., Lorman v. City of Rutland, 193 A.3d 1174, 1183 (finding the City of Rutland’s 
decisions as to its sewer system and whether to replace damaged pipes rather than the entire system 
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Foreseeability in Assessing Takings Damages, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., Feb. 17–
19, 2011, at 733, 755. 
 445. See Charles H. Oldham, Wildfire Liability and the Federal Government: A Double-Edged 
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1001 (9th Cir. 2000))). 
 447. Burling & Wake, supra note 444, at 779–80.  
 448. Id. at 781. 
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that the takings claim is based upon a tort.449  The interrelationships 
between inverse condemnation law and governmental tort liability have 
been significant over time.450  For example, before California adopted 
government immunity, “inverse condemnation and the concept of 
nuisance . . . were the two principal judicial tools for affording relief for 
property injuries arising out of an admittedly ‘governmental’ function 
where no statute authorized recovery.”451 
Federal, state, and local governments may not defend against inverse 
condemnation claims by asserting sovereign or governmental immunity 
because the government is not immune from claims for the protection or 
enforcement of constitutional rights.452  Tort law does not govern these 
claims and instead, any damage to real property that public improvement 
proximately causes may be compensable in inverse condemnation 
without regard to the foreseeability of the injury or the negligence of the 
public entity, depending upon the jurisdiction.453  Tort damages such as 
personal injury, emotional distress, or punitive damages are not 
recoverable because the claim is limited to property damages.454 
Tort law does not govern takings claims for compensation, but we 
see from the discussion above that tort defenses, such as the doctrine of 
necessity, may be imported into takings claim litigation.455  In addition, 
some jurisdictions require a finding of negligence or nuisance to support 
a takings claim.456  For example, Texas courts require that plaintiffs 
asserting a taking under the state constitution prove more than mere 
negligence on the part of the government and show that the 
“governmental entity knows that a specific act is causing identifiable 
harm or knows that the harm is substantially certain to result.”457  
Sovereign immunity does not shield the government from a takings 
claim, but the state’s focus on intent in Texas certainly sounds in tort 
law.  Tort law doctrines should not be applied to inverse condemnation 
 
 449. Id. at 782 (citing STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 2-5(e)(3) (4th ed. 2009)). 
 450. Arvo Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of 
Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727, 738 (1967). 
 451. Id. at 738–39 (footnotes omitted). 
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AGENCIES AND OFFICERS § 1:21 (Jon L. Craig ed., 2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 2019). 
 453. Joyce S. Mendlin & Roger M. Rosen, Applying the Inverse Condemnation Remedy to Water 
Damage, L.A. LAW., Apr. 2015, at 14–15 (discussing federal and California constitutional claims for 
property damage from pipe and sewer system failures). 
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 455. See supra notes 226–41 and accompanying text. 
 456. See, e.g., Christ v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 287 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 457. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 816 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Tarrant 
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and damages claims.458 
Climate change litigation based on the state and federal 
government’s failure to act has largely been futile.  For example, two 
minor children sued the State of Oregon in Chernaik v. Brown seeking 
declaratory relief based on the public-trust doctrine for the state’s failure 
to protect public trust resources, including the atmosphere, water 
resources, islands, shorelands, coastal areas, wildlife, and fish against 
carbon dioxide emissions in Oregon.459  The appellate court reversed the 
trial court’s initial dismissal of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, and 
upon remand, the trial court granted the state’s motion for summary 
judgment.460  The court reviewed the trial court decision based on the 
plaintiffs’ argument “that the public-trust doctrine does more than 
restrain state action. . . .  [T]he doctrine imposes fiduciary obligations on 
the state to take affirmative action to prevent substantial impairment to 
public-trust resources . . . from the effects of climate change.”461  
However, it concluded that granting the state’s motion for summary 
judgment was correct because “the Oregon public-trust doctrine is rooted 
in the idea that the state is restrained from disposing or allowing uses of 
public-trust resources that substantially impair the recognized public use 
of those resources.”462  The court noted that it could find “no source 
under the Oregon conception of the public-trust doctrine for imposing 
fiduciary duties on the state to affirmatively act to protect public-trust 
resources from the effects of climate change.”463 
A group of young people, including one of the plaintiffs in the 
Chernaik state case, also filed suit in federal court in Oregon.  The 
plaintiffs in Juliana v. United States alleged that the federal government 
violated their civil rights to life, liberty, and property under the Fifth 
Amendment by failing to take action to phase out carbon pollution and 
by subsidizing the extraction, production, and use of fossil fuels.464  
Plaintiffs further alleged that the federal defendants had known for more 
than fifty years “the unusually dangerous risks of harm to human life, 
liberty, and property that would be caused by continued fossil fuel 
 
 458. See infra pp. 493–94. 
 459. 436 P.3d 26, 27–29 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). 
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burning.”465  The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had presented 
substantial evidence that the federal government’s promotion of fossil 
fuel use and its “failure to change existing policy may hasten an 
environmental apocalypse.”466  However, the court “reluctantly” 
concluded that “the plaintiffs’ impressive case for redress must be 
presented to the political branches of government” because the relief the 
plaintiffs requested was not within the court’s constitutional power to 
redress.467 
When the government faces inverse condemnation or damagings 
liability, insurance coverage is generally not available.468  This lack of 
insurance may encourage risk-averse local governments to avoid 
litigation-prone regulation even if the land use regulations or government 
actions are beneficial.469  Municipal insurance policies overwhelmingly 
exclude coverage for regulatory takings using some version of the 
following language: “Claims arising out of or in connection with inverse 
condemnation caused by the construction of a public work or public 
improvement, land use regulation, land use planning, the principles of 
eminent domain, or condemnation proceedings by whatever name 
called . . . .”470  While larger cities may be able to spread the risk or self-
insure, smaller cities may be inclined to avoid regulations that risk 
takings liability.471 
Private landowners may individually insure against losses from 
wildfires, but in some cases, they may eventually lose coverage if they 
live in high-risk areas.472  California’s state insurance commissioner 
announced that one month after the November 2018 wildfires insurance 
claims were already at $9 billion and expected to rise.473  The insurance 
industry in California faces several climate change-related risks in 
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California including physical risk (increasing property damage, health 
risks, and other physical impacts), transition risk (economic move away 
from carbon-intensive industries may impact an insurers’ assets), and 
liability risk (increased litigation and liability for losses).474  A 
symposium convened by the Center for Law, Energy & the Environment 
at UC Berkeley in June 2018 “identified the top risks and opportunities 
the insurance community and California residents face in a changing 
climate, as well as key regulatory reforms, new products, and 
technological and research developments needed to identify and address 
them.”475 
Insurance companies may proactively hire private fire-fighting 
companies to protect properties after a fire starts and their insured’s 
property is at risk.476  These practices typically apply to high-cost 
property in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) and command higher 
premiums.477  In addition to experiencing higher insurance premiums, 
some homeowners have reduced their coverage and accepted higher 
deductibles to continue their insurance.478  For example, the California 
Department of Insurance noted that homeowners in the WUI have faced 
increasing premiums and nonrenewal of their policies as this trend 
reflects insurers’ rational response to predicted wildfire losses that 
exceed premiums collected.479  While California has a state-sponsored 
insurance program (FAIR Plan) for homeowners unable to obtain a 
policy on the open market, not everyone can afford the premiums.480 
Residents living in high-risk areas in California or other states may 
eventually find themselves without insurance for wildfires or may need 
to relocate if they are unable to rebuild after a fire.481  In December 2019, 
California regulators “imposed a one-year moratorium banning insurers 
from dropping policies for homeowners in wildfire-ravaged areas of the 
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state.”482  According to the California Insurance Commissioner, the 
moratorium provides an opportunity for insurers and homeowners to plan 
for who will deal with future wildfires.483  Existing California law 
protects homeowners who experienced a total loss from wildfire against 
being dropped by insurers.484  The moratorium is based on a California 
law also enacted in 2019 that extends protection against insurance 
cancellation to homeowners living in wildfire emergency areas who did 
not lose their home.485  Some have questioned whether homeowners in 
disaster-prone areas could be precluded from recovering tort damages 
from public and private entities because they essentially “came to the 
nuisance.”  While this is a valid concern, we are entering into a climate 
crisis that threatens communities not previously considered to be located 
in disaster-prone areas.  Therefore, we need to address the larger 
question of how we can address paying for these disasters without 
burdening the unfortunate souls directly impacted. 
States may choose to grant state subsidies or extend insurance 
protection for inverse condemnation or damagings claims so that the 
threat of takings liability does not result in reduced regulatory action to 
address important land use and environmental issues.486  States may also 
need to act to prevent the specter of public utilities facing bankruptcy.  
As discussed above, in rejecting a change to liability standards for 
inverse condemnation in an earlier version of legislation, California 
legislators instead agreed to spend $1 billion over five years (paid from 
proceeds of California’s cap-and-trade climate program) to improve fire 
prevention.487  In addition, California Senate Bill 901 enhanced the 
wildfire-mitigation plans required from utilities and allowed utility 
companies to “shift some fire-related costs to consumers,” so long as the 
company was not negligent.488  Professor Michael Wara, a climate 
researcher, warns that legislators must do more, including looking at 
existing insurance limitations for utilities and homeowners.489 
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Governments also face liability when insurance companies pay 
claims to private property owners and then sue in subrogation for 
government actions.  In AGCS Marine Insurance Co. v. Arlington 
County, two insurers filed an inverse condemnation suit against 
Arlington County for property damage to a grocery store caused by the 
malfunction of a county sewer line that allowed raw sewage to flow into 
the store.490  The Virginia Supreme Court concluded that while the 
original complaint sounded wholly in tort, the allegations stated a viable 
claim for inverse condemnation.491  It “distinguishe[s] an inverse 
condemnation claim from a mere tort claim alleging negligence, 
nuisance, trespass, or other common-law theories of recovery,” by 
pointing to the requirement that the damage was caused by “a purposeful 
act or omission seeking to advance the ‘public welfare.’”492  The original 
complaint alleged that the County was responsible for property damage 
for its failure “to properly maintain and operate the sewage treatment 
plant,” but such a claim would sound in tort and sovereign immunity 
would shield the County.493  The court held that the circuit court erred by 
not allowing the insurers to amend their complaint to state a viable claim 
for inverse condemnation.494 
Disaster victims, regardless of what type of disaster has occurred, 
should “properly fil[e] and document[] insurance claims [a]s a necessary 
part of rebuilding after a natural disaster.”495  Typical property insurance 
claims involve a one-loss event where the insurance adjuster responds 
promptly and partial payment begins the process of recovery.496  
However, disaster claims may overwhelm insurance carriers resulting in 
inexperienced adjusters, delayed inspections, and unpaid claims.497  
Lawyers involved in unpaid claims and delayed response should notify 
the insurance carrier, document any repairs, and be familiar with their 
client’s policy provisions.498  Property owners and their lawyers should 
also be aware that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
might provide assistance with damages not covered by the policy, 
depending on the natural disaster and available funding.499 
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Federal assistance specifically for flood victims may also be 
available in the form of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).  
Enacted over fifty years ago as a temporary program to offer federal 
flood insurance at a low cost and encourage state and local restrictions on 
floodplain development, the NFIP has instead operated as a “permanent 
federal subsidy for flood-prone properties along rivers and coastlines 
abandoned as commercially unviable by the private insurance 
industry.”500  Some argue that regulatory and physical takings doctrines 
likely contributed to the NFIP’s ineffectiveness because landowners 
restricted from developing in coastal and floodplain areas sought just 
compensation from government actions regulating their private 
property.501 
Ensuing litigation and the threat of litigation under the Takings 
Clause may have shifted the cost of development in risky areas from the 
property owner to the public and deterred local government and 
communities from regulating to promote coastal and floodplain safety.502  
While regulatory takings claims have not been as successful as physical 
takings claims (when flood-control structures release floodwaters onto 
private property), the confusion between torts and takings may be 
responsible for the differing results.503  The decision as to who should 
pay for disasters generates a mix of community and individual incentives 
to develop or not, and to regulate or not, in areas prone to the risk of 
disasters such as flooding or wildfires.504 
IV. MITIGATION, EMERGENCY RESPONSE, AND REBUILDING 
Coastal areas, riverbanks, floodplains, aging infrastructure, and 
properties located in the WUI will continue to be vulnerable to more 
frequent and intense weather events associated with climate change, 
rising temperatures, and sea level rise.505  Parts II and III explored the 
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compensation aspect of the disaster cycle.  This Part briefly discusses the 
other strategic processes of the disaster cycle including mitigation, 
emergency response, and rebuilding.  It also summarizes some of the 
proposals to reduce or prevent the costs from disasters. 
A. Mitigation 
1. Land Use Planning 
Historically, humans have sought to manage water quantity and 
quality through hydrological alterations such as diverting water for 
hydropower, agriculture, and urban uses, as well as armoring against 
drainage water or rising tides by building dikes, floodwalls, levees, dams, 
and stream channelization.  These modifications have eroded riverbanks 
and shorelines, and destroyed aquatic habitat, fisheries, biodiversity, and 
ecosystem services provided by floodplains and wetlands.506  Not 
surprisingly given our long-held tradition of “conquering” nature, we call 
the common law rule allowing landowners to alter the natural flow of 
water to protect their own property from damage, even if their neighbor 
suffers, the “common enemy doctrine.”507 
The hydromodification of the Mississippi River Basin to manage 
floods has taught us three lessons: “1) Rivers will flood; 2) levees will 
fail; and 3) unwise floodplain development will happen if we let it.”508  
Levees built after floods in 1927 protected property but also stopped the 
sand and silt that would have built up the land and kept it above water.  
The master plan to protect New Orleans with stronger levees, pumps, and 
gates and restore the coast after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 will exceed 
$50 billion.509  Our past approaches to disaster by installing levees, 
floodgates, pumps, and diversion channels, as well as, restoring breaches, 
dunes, and marshes may help provide protection against hurricanes, 
floods, and sea rise, but will unlikely be sufficient to protect our riskiest 
 
HKVV] [hereinafter NCA4 REPORT] (analyzing, among other things, “current trends in global 
change, both human-induced and natural, and project[ing] major trends for the subsequent 25 to 100 
years”). 
 506. See SHELLEY ROSS SAXER & JONATHAN ROSENBLOOM, SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE 
AND SUSTAINABILITY 155–57 (2018). 
 507. Id. at 155–56. 
 508. CHRISTINE A. KLEIN & SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MISSISSIPPI RIVER TRAGEDIES: A CENTURY 
OF UNNATURAL DISASTER 187–89 (2014). 
 509. See John Schwartz, How to Save a Sinking Coast? Katrina Created a Laboratory, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1T30P9l [https://perma.cc/6TNS-DLTS]. 
482 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
areas.510 
In the face of rising waters and flooding events, some landowners 
have appealed to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) to 
construct levees in particular locations to maximize the potential 
development of their land.  The Corps has rejected many of these 
proposals, mostly because the proposed levee locations would interfere 
with or even destroy valuable wetlands, and courts have upheld the 
Corps’ decisions against landowner challenges.511  Communities left 
outside hurricane levee projects are unprotected by the hard 
infrastructure of levees and seawalls, but currently “a landowner does not 
have a takings claim when the government elects not to protect land from 
the threat of natural hazards.”512  Some have promoted ascribing liability 
for government inaction, however most major litigation has continued to 
reject inverse condemnation claims based on inaction as insufficient.513 
Levees are the main defense against flooding, but they require active 
maintenance and federal agencies “have taken no action on the remaining 
key national levee safety-related activities for which they were 
responsible.”514  President Obama required greater flood precautions for 
federal infrastructure in 2015, but days before Hurricane Harvey, 
President Trump rolled back the Obama order.515  The U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development “reinstated some of the Obama 
requirements for post-hurricane housing funding, including a directive 
for them to take ‘continued sea level rise’ into account.”516  Climate 
change will “cause substantial losses to infrastructure and property and 
impede the rate of economic growth.”517  The most recent National 
Climate Assessment report projects trade and agriculture impacts from 
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extreme weather events driven by global warming.518  Climate change is 
a risk to the strength of the U.S. trade position and “[r]ising 
temperatures, extreme heat, drought, wildfire on rangelands and heavy 
downpours are expected to increasingly disrupt agricultural productivity 
in the United States.”519 
Land use planning at the local level will be key to reducing the cycle 
of damage, compensation, and rebuilding in the same risky location.  
Developing better preventative and response strategies for major 
disasters such as flooding and wildfires may help reduce the 
insurance/liability compensation needed to provide for victims damaged 
by these events.  The compensation requirements will necessarily 
increase as these events escalate with climate change impacts and as 
communities continue to develop in risk-prone areas.  Municipal 
regulation should address infrastructure and patterns of development to 
adapt to hazards and reduce the vulnerability of structures to fire risk, 
flood risk, and other climate-related risks.520 
Local government’s failure to adapt to climate change through 
appropriate planning and adaptation measures may eventually result in 
tort liability when there is a duty to adapt under the circumstances.521  
Adaptation litigation has emerged as a pathway to: “(1) change planning 
culture, (2) use natural disasters as catalysts for adaptive planning, and 
(3) navigate more effectively the tensions between public adaptation 
interests and private property rights.”522  These various mechanisms for 
recovering the costs of infrastructure changes will be vital as we make 
the land use changes needed to increase floodplains, cope with drought 
and wildfires, and manage our coasts for severe storms and rising sea 
levels. 
Local government action in the face of climate change will be 
needed, not only to adapt to changing conditions and threats, but to 
aggressively mitigate climate change by reducing local greenhouse gas 
emissions.523  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change suggests 
we need aggressive mitigation to adapt to climate change because 
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“reduc[ing] the rate as well as the magnitude of warming . . . also 
increases the time available for adaptation to a particular level of climate 
change.”524  Planning for resilient communities should include both 
adaptation and mitigation because “effective regulation at the local level 
cannot be achieved through adaptation alone no matter how robust.”525 
2. Retreat 
One way to prevent damages in risk-prone areas such as floodplains, 
coastlines, and wildfire zones is to encourage federal, state, and local 
governments to “buy out” these properties rather than continue to support 
the cycle of damage-compensation-rebuild.526  Buyouts are getting more 
expensive as storms and flooding get higher and move inland.527  These 
buyouts are voluntary and when the buyout process takes too long, 
homeowners are able to obtain taxpayer-subsidized flood insurance 
policies allowing them to rebuild in the same place.528  FEMA’s Pre-
Disaster Mitigation Grant Program rose from $25 million in 
appropriations in 2015 to $250 million in 2019 to provide funding for 
buyouts and other safeguards such as elevating homes.529 
Buyout programs were initiated in response to Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita on the Gulf Coast, severe flooding in Iowa in 2008, and 
Superstorm Sandy in 2012.530  Professor John Lovett reviewed the 
efficacy of these three programs and outlined four basic lessons learned 
from these efforts.  First, buyout programs should focus “on a relatively 
small or tightly clustered community of property owners.”531  Second, the 
prices offered in a buyout need to be high enough to convince property 
owners they are being made whole, will be able to relocate successfully 
to another community, and will receive post-relocation assistance to help 
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with maintaining community social ties.532  Third, buyouts need to 
recognize and incorporate “the subjective values people have in their 
homes.”533  Fourth, a successful buyout program must assure property 
owners “they will regain the social capital of their former community 
lives.”534 
3. Insurer Incentives 
The economics of protecting homeowners living in high-risk areas 
from wildfire damage are not necessarily cost effective.535  Government 
firefighting agencies prioritize structure protection resulting in 
overprotection, since the government pays more to fight fires than the 
fair market value of the structures protected.536  In addition, government 
regulators may require insurance companies to insure primary residences 
in high fire areas without pricing the coverage according to the risk.537  
Finally, because of the availability of federal disaster assistance, insurers 
do not have the incentive to require homebuilders to use fire safe 
materials when building in wildland-urban interface areas because 
homeowners in these risk areas do not fully internalize these risks.538 
4. Shutting Down the Electrical Grid or Burying Power Lines 
Shutting down the electrical grid in the face of high winds, red-flag 
warnings, and drought is an immediate fix to reducing the risk of utility-
caused wildfire.539  This is a stop-gap measure as other wildfire solutions 
such as increased funding, forest-thinning, prescribed burns, stricter 
building codes, and burying power lines underground will take up to a 
decade to achieve.540  Utility companies have recently used this approach 
and turned off power to customers during extreme fire danger conditions.  
In October 2018, PG&E shut off power to part of Northern California for 
public safety purposes, leaving almost 60,000 customers without 
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power.541  The day before the PG&E shut off, SDG&E turned off power 
in Southern California to about 360 customers near Cleveland National 
Forest.542 
Not only have utility companies begun using this safety “feature,” 
but in early 2019, a federal judge added new conditions of probation to 
PG&E.543  The court imposed probation after a jury in 2016 convicted 
PG&E on six felony counts arising out of the San Bruno explosion of a 
gas pipeline.544  Following a determination that PG&E caused eighteen 
wildfires in 2017, the court imposed three new conditions on PG&E 
including this one: 
 At all times during the 2019 Wildfire Season (and thereafter), 
PG&E may supply electricity only through those parts of its electrical 
grid it has determined to be safe under the wind conditions then 
prevailing.  Conversely, PG&E must de-energize any part of its grid not 
yet rated as safe by PG&E for the wind conditions then prevailing until 
those conditions have subsided.  For example, if Santa Ana winds of up 
to thirty miles per hour are expected in a given county and if PG&E has 
not yet rated those power lines as safe for such winds, then PG&E must 
de-energize those lines during the wind event and beforehand notify 
affected customers that those lines will be de-energized.  In 
determining safety, PG&E may not take into account the need for 
reliability of service, the inconvenience to customers resulting from 
interruption in service, or its impact upon PG&E’s revenues and 
profits.  Reliability is important but safety must come first.  Profits are 
important but safety must come first.  Only safe operation will be 
allowed.545 
The court in the PG&E probation order recognized that service 
interruption would “inconvenience” customers, but did not discuss the 
substantial cost to customers in terms of loss of productivity, damaged 
goods, and health and safety considerations when electricity is off.546 
Comparing such losses to the loss of life from a fire may not be 
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compelling, but projected losses from power shutdowns should be 
compared to the cost of burying the power lines that are susceptible to 
high wind fire risks.  In adopting a policy of preemptive shut-offs to 
reduce wildfire risks, PG&E joins SDG&E, which began using this 
strategy in 2013, and Edison which adopted the strategy in 2017.547  In 
fall 2019, PG&E shut off power to hundreds of thousands of people in 
California to prevent electrical equipment from starting wildfires during 
hazardous weather conditions of winds and low humidity.548  Longer-
term solutions such as burying power lines underground are expensive 
and PG&E management and shareholders may not be willing to 
undertake the capital expense.549  Unfortunately, turning off the power 
will not prevent all wildfires, which are also be caused by arson, 
campfires, and lightening, and blackouts will make it more difficult for 
people to respond for help or evacuate if there is a fire.550  Power shutoffs 
will also have life-threatening consequences for vulnerable groups such 
as the sick and elderly and will impact others as “people may miss work, 
their food or medicine may spoil, and heat becomes a concern without air 
conditioning.”551 
B. Response 
The federal government has increased disaster aid programs to direct 
and implement the federal response to disasters.  The “principle statute” 
is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
(Stafford Act),552 which coordinates the federal government’s response 
and the system for funneling aid to a particular state after a Presidential 
declaration of an “emergency” or “major disaster.”553  FEMA administers 
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the Stafford Act and provides aid such as grants, crisis counseling, 
disaster unemployment insurance, and housing.554  The amount and type 
of aid provided by the federal government in conjunction with state 
disaster response will vary over time as the needs of communities 
change.555 
Fire suppression costs at the federal level have been over $1 billion 
in thirteen of the last sixteen years, while states collectively spent almost 
$2 billion in 2014.556  Although it is not possible to eliminate wildfire 
vulnerability in areas with abundant fuel such as homes and vegetation, 
mitigation preparation allows expanded time between fire eruption and 
its spread into a community and determines whether firefighters focus on 
evacuation or home protection.557  Strategies for community partnerships 
between agencies and citizens is essential to reduce wildfire 
vulnerability, particularly in the WUI where wildfire ignitions and large 
fires have increased due to intensified land use by humans and escalated 
fire activity due to climate change.558  Pre-fire vulnerability reduction 
such as fire-resistant homes, defensible space, reduction of roadside 
fuels, and a network of fuels reduction will allow firefighters to combat 
the fire safely.559 
Homeowners in the WUI are encouraged to protect their properties 
proactively by “reducing vegetation near [their] homes or storing 
firewood away from structures.”560  Nevertheless, many WUI owners do 
not take these relatively inexpensive measures with the result that some 
states impose increased liability on these property owners.561  As noted 
earlier in Section II.D regarding insurance, some private insurance 
companies hire “private firefighting companies to protect properties after 
a fire starts and a property is at risk, but before the fire reaches the 
wildland-urban interface property.”562 
The public may economically overprotect WUI properties against 
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wildfires by fire suppression efforts and insurance protection for those 
living in areas with high fire risks.563  Public and political pressures on 
firefighters may force them “to sacrifice control of the wildfire to defend 
buildings” even if what they are doing is economically wasteful and has 
no effect on the fire.564  In addition, homeowners living in high fire risk 
areas do not internalize these risks because insurance companies are 
required “to provide artificially-lowered insurance rates for primary 
residences in high fire areas.”565 
There are also hidden human costs incurred by both the public and 
the firefighters as the WUI wildfire threats increase.566  Developers, with 
the blessing of community leaders, are building housing developments in 
forested areas lacking adequate ingress, egress, and water supplies.567  
These “suicide subdivisions” are ultimately indefensible to wildfires and 
residents face greater risks of death by being trapped in their homes, 
while firefighters who rush to the rescue are exposed to heightened risk 
of wildfire exposure.568  Wildfires on public lands are natural 
occurrences and encourage the renewal of the soil and a new generation 
of forest as they destroy pests, diseases, and undergrowth.569  However, 
when fires threaten communities in the WUI, federal land managers 
cannot “simply let these fires play their traditional ecological role of 
destruction and rejuvenation.”570 
We need to develop risk management strategies to deal with the 
increasing risk of wildfires brought on by climate change.  Land use 
strategies such as managing the WUI, buying out properties in high-risk 
areas, using building codes, considering liability rules for fires such as 
making utilities liable, increasing fire insurance costs in WUI property 
ownership, and becoming more aggressive about removing vegetation 
will be helpful in mitigating wildfire damages.571  In addition, preventive 
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precautions such as shut-offs when power lines go down, 
“[u]ndergrounding wires or replacing wooden poles with steel ones,” and 
using best practices in wildfire prevention will help reduce damages 
requiring compensation.572  With wildfires being part of the “new 
normal” more work needs to be done on emergency response in terms of 
evacuation orders, warning systems, fire equipment sharing, and 
funding.573 
C. Rebuilding 
Voters think that there should be limits on building in wildfire 
zones.574  A poll prepared by the UC Berkeley Institute of Governmental 
Studies for the Los Angeles Times showed that there was “broad backing 
across party lines, demographic groups and all regions in California for 
restricting growth in wildfire zones,” even though “1 in 4 Californians 
live in areas considered at high risk for wildfires.”575  Some have argued 
that we should “give governments the tools they need to exercise their 
existing authority to condemn severe repetitive loss properties and 
convert them into open space without relying on voluntary-buyout 
programs.”576  With flood and wildfire damages, if we do not price 
insurance according to the actual risk, subsidized government insurance 
schemes will lead to a cycle of “build-destroy-rebuild.”577  Such 
programs burden taxpayers and hide the actual risk faced by 
homeowners, which encourages development in the WUI or in 
floodplains and coastal areas.578 
Aging infrastructure is susceptible to climate change as extreme 
weather and climate-related impacts increase risks or failures of critical 
systems.579 Heavy rain, flooding, heat, wildfires, and other extreme 
events may disrupt energy and transportation systems, including access 
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to roads, bridge stability, and pipeline safety.580  “[R]ising temperatures, 
sea level rise, and changes in extreme events are expected to increasingly 
disrupt and damage critical infrastructure and property, labor 
productivity, and the vitality of our communities.”581  Land use practices 
encourage infrastructure on private properties “designed to meet a 
predetermined set of criteria or maintain a fixed level of performance 
established at a single point in time.”582  This “gray infrastructure” in the 
form of “concrete, metal, pipes, tunnels, [and] tanks” is subject to decay 
and does not respond or adjust to changes.583  “Rapid and intense 
disturbances, such as hurricanes and floods, and slower-moving 
ecosystem changes, such as climate change,” threaten the resilience of 
communities.584  Resilient infrastructure must be able “to resist, bounce 
back, adapt, or transform following disturbances.”585 
CONCLUSION 
As climate change increases the severity of droughts, wildfires, 
flooding, hurricanes, and other extreme weather,586 property damages 
will escalate and individuals, companies, and governments will continue 
to seek cost reimbursement from others.  Ultimately, someone must pay 
for these increasingly foreseeable costs due to climate change impacts.  
This Article examined the various ways we are currently paying for 
disasters and recommends alternatives to the circular litigation approach 
where damaged property owners file lawsuits against insurers, 
government, and private actors, who in turn sue others to recover their 
losses.  We can seek to spread these risks by calling on the government 
to pay inverse condemnation damages or allocate billions of dollars in 
subsidies and aid through taxation of its citizens.  We can also call on 
utility companies to structure their fees based on the increased risk to 
those individuals and companies choosing to locate in drought, wildfire, 
and flood prone areas.  Alternatively, we can turn to private market 
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solutions such as regulatory takings insurance to provide for risk-
spreading in the face of regulatory action to adapt to climate change 
risks.587 
We must all pay for the economic costs of climate change that we 
cannot avoid through prevention, disaster response, and retreat.  
Currently, these costs are imposed on those who suffer from extreme 
weather events and other climate-related harms.588  The National Climate 
Assessment report predicts that the U.S. economy will experience costs 
of $500 billion per year from climate change losses, resulting “in an 
annual 10 percent reduction in gross domestic product by the end of the 
century.”589  All of us contribute to climate change, but we do not 
necessarily pay this hidden climate tax proportionally.590  Damages from 
floods and wildfires are not fairly distributed across our communities, 
but someone must pay the costs of these events.591 
California’s recent approach for dealing with the wildfire 
compensation crisis is to extend an existing charge on utility customers’ 
bills for a Department of Water Resources bond established during the 
California energy crisis in 2000 and scheduled to expire by 2021.592  This 
customer charge would generate $10.5 billion through a fifteen-year 
extension for deposit into a wildfire fund.593  SDG&E, Edison, and 
PG&E utilities have the option of contributing a matching $10.5 billion 
in exchange for capping their wildfire liability.594  Along with other 
complex provisions, the utilities will be required to obtain safety 
certification before using the wildfire fund as a second insurance policy 
and will only need to pay the funds back if they acted “unreasonably to 
cause a fire.”595  Funds like the wildfire fund in California will operate to 
spread the risk by requiring all ratepayers benefitted by the electrical grid 
to shoulder the burdens that disasters do not distribute fairly across our 
communities. 
The major focus of this Article was to explore inverse condemnation 
and damagings claims at the state and federal level as the means to 
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compensate for disasters.  The Fifth Amendment and state inverse 
condemnation and damagings clauses are designed to distribute fairly the 
burdens incurred in providing public benefits.  In Armstrong v. United 
States, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without 
just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”596 
As discussed in Part II, many of the states with a state inverse 
condemnation and damagings provision rely on the Armstrong rationale 
to support claims that allow private individuals to recover for damages 
resulting from government or private entity actions for the public benefit.  
State courts have multiple approaches to resolving claims for flooding 
and wildfire disasters.  In some cases, it is difficult to distinguish 
between tort and inverse condemnation, while in other cases courts 
require tort-like conditions such as negligence, reasonableness, nuisance, 
or fault in explicitly inverse condemnation actions.  In the California 
wildfire cases, inverse condemnation claims do not require fault and a 
strict liability standard applies.  Strict liability in inverse condemnation 
and damagings is a risk-spreading standard that provides for 
compensation to those damaged when the government or private entity is 
acting for the public benefit.  This approach is similar to the products 
liability approach in tort law, which uses strict liability to spread the risk 
for consumer damage among those companies serving consumers in the 
marketplace. 
If we could take a fresh start in deciding how to compensate victims 
of disasters using inverse condemnation and damagings claims, I propose 
that the inverse condemnation and damagings claims found in many state 
constitutions and statutory provisions observe a “strict liability” standard.  
I use quotes here because strict liability is a tort standard, and I would 
argue that inverse condemnation or damagings require just compensation 
without the need to refer to a tort standard.  Regardless of the 
terminology, such a standard would compensate those people damaged 
by activities designed to benefit the public as a whole, regardless of the 
actor’s negligence.  Approaching takings claims as purely a mechanism 
for risk spreading would also allow takings claims for government 
inaction when there is a duty to act for the public benefit. 
Tort doctrines such as negligence, nuisance, reasonableness, intent, 
knowledge, comparative negligence, coming to the nuisance, and 
 
 596. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
494 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
necessity should not be applicable to the takings analysis, which focuses 
on equitably spreading the benefits and burdens of acts taken for a public 
benefit.  Although private utilities in California decry the strict liability 
standard applied by the courts in the wildfire cases, most of the litigation 
occurs in situations where fault on the part of the utilities has already 
been established or admitted. 
Insurance is also a mechanism for spreading the risk.  Therefore, 
insurers should not be able to seek subrogation from public or private 
entities that would otherwise be strictly liable to private landowners for 
inverse condemnation or damaging.  Insurers should still be able to 
subrogate a claim against a private or public entity if the claim is for tort 
liability such as negligence or nuisance.  Insurers must price their 
policies to incentivize property owners in disaster-prone areas such as the 
WUI, the floodplains, and the coast, to explore development alternatives, 
take special precautions in building, and think hard about continuing a 
cycle of rebuilding after disasters.  In certain situations, the government 
may assist landowners in voluntarily relocating by exercising its eminent 
domain power to buy-out risky properties. 
Finally, public or private entities held liable for disaster damages 
from flooding or wildfire based on inverse condemnation should be able 
to pass these costs on to those who have received the benefit of their 
actions unless the entities have been negligent in fulfilling their duties to 
the public.  Ratepayers and taxpayers will need to bear much of the cost 
for receiving public benefits.  Just as with insurance policy costs, utility 
rates and taxes should reflect the increased risk of living in disaster-
prone areas.  Paying for disasters in the future will not be easy, but we 
must face these challenges together and ensure that we are distributing 
the benefits and burdens of our public needs as equitably as possible. 
